The Palestinian issue enters the year 2024 under extraordinary and unprecedented circumstances not seen for decades, with war overshadowing Gaza since the [Al-Aqsa Flood] operation. This offensive, carried out by the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas", on October 7, has dominated the scene.
The current confrontation is the fiercest among the battles fought by the Palestinian resistance in [Gaza] since Hamas took control of the enclave in the summer of 2007.
This war, being the most extensive and inclusive, will shape a new reality in the Palestinian cause and the Gaza Strip. It will also influence the Israeli reality and the Palestinian internal political scene and impose itself on the regional and international environment on a large scale.
Saraya al-Quds, one of the military units that participated in the "Al-Aqsa Flood" operation
A New Phase
October 7 marked a qualitative development in the behavior of Palestinian resistance in Gaza, with an attack initiative that was organized and expansive, covering the "Gaza Envelope" settlement area.
The attack targeted military, security, and intelligence sites and Israeli settlements, rendering the Israeli army's "Gaza Division" out of service.
The resistance managed to capture dozens of soldiers, officers, and civilians from the occupation army, releasing a number of them in a partial exchange deal mediated by Qatar, Egypt, and the USA last November.
With this attack, the resistance has ended a phase of Israel's containment attempts and coexistence with it and its control over Gaza.
Since the "Sword of Jerusalem" battle in May 2021, the resistance has defined a new and escalating course of action and dealings with the occupation's violations in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
This is the stage that set broader parameters for the resistance's actions to confront Israel's attempts to impose control in the West Bank and Jerusalem, annex them, and expand settlement and Judaization activities.
In contrast, Israel's declaration of war reflects a departure from its previous strategy of avoiding engagement with the Palestinian resistance in a broad and encompassing confrontation, including a wide-ranging ground invasion. Israel has set goals for its war on Gaza to eliminate Hamas, dismantle its military capabilities, and recover Israeli prisoners held by the resistance.
Despite the massive destruction inflicted by Israel in the Strip and the complete destruction of its infrastructure, the Palestinian resistance continues to engage in armed clashes with the Israeli occupation army across all sectors of the Gaza Strip, nearly three months after the war's onset.
Impossible Goals
The course of the battlefield raises considerable doubts about Israel's ability to achieve its goal of annihilating Hamas and dismantling its capacities, given the nature of Hamas and its deep-rooted existence in the Palestinian case generally and in Gaza specifically. Hamas, which has controlled the sector for 17 years, has built a profound organisational, political, military, and social presence.
Israel does not set clear criteria for measuring the achievement of this goal, which would require it to impose long-term security and military control to ensure it, doubtful according to experts and analysts, including Israelis.
Hamas's ability to continue executing quality operations against the occupying army demonstrates a significant challenge to Israel's ability to achieve this goal or withstand the consequences of a prolonged attrition war.
Moreover, the issue of prisoner recovery faces another challenge after Hamas announced the stoppage of swaps before a ceasefire and troop withdrawal. The Israeli occupation army's attempts to execute special operations to free prisoners in Gaza have failed, incurring losses among soldiers and the intended prisoners to be freed.
The Day After the War
The day after the war, which has been anticipated for months, poses another challenge for Israel and its supporters in Washington. The ideas put forward to address this conundrum lack a real opportunity for implementation given the complexities of the scene in Gaza, and in the Palestinian and Israeli political environments.
As for proposals regarding the involvement of United Nations peacekeeping forces, rapid intervention forces, Arab police forces, or multinational forces to maintain stability and govern or even protect Gaza, these are mere theories difficult to implement.
Israel might find itself entangled in Gaza, with no one to rescue it, and the only alternative left if Israel refuses to withdraw is to remain as an occupying power. This is something Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has hinted at several times, hoping to prevent Hamas from declaring victory or regaining control.
For Israel, opting for this choice will not be easy, as the Palestinian resistance can continue fighting in an open urban war at a minimal cost and under exhausting conditions for the Israeli occupation army.
The resistance today can use simple means to confront the army's machinery and soldiers, causing losses, particularly in urban areas where the resistance enjoys broad public support.
The Biden administration proposes its approach for the day after the war through the option of reinstating a "renewed" Palestinian Authority to govern the Strip. This faces severe challenges given the vast public rejection of this authority and its symbols. Netanyahu's government and the extreme right within it also reject this option, for their vision focuses on liquidating the Palestinian cause and all its political manifestations while discussing plans to annex the West Bank and expel Palestinians from it.
The absence of a realistic and feasible vision for the day after the war, and Israel's incapacity to re-occupy the Strip and endure an attrition war, will force it to withdraw. But not before it has destroyed it and reimposed a blockade on it, leaving Palestinians with the option to continue the resistance to force new realities that allow Hamas to rebuild its position.
The Biden administration proposes reinstating the Palestinian Authority to govern the Strip, which Netanyahu rejects
Regional Implications
The return of the Palestinian issue to the forefront and the continuation of confrontations in Palestine at various levels represent a new reality in the region. This introduces a new security and political environment, shifting the region from pathways of integrating Israel into the regional political, security, and economic system to a fragile and combustible setting.
The experience of October 7 introduced a new security and strategic concept for Israel, which faces security challenges with Lebanese Hezbollah and now different groups like Ansar Allah in Yemen and Iran-loyal armed factions in Syria and Iraq, requiring Israel and the United States to adopt new security approaches.
The war on Gaza has also impacted the Arab public environment, with the official Arab stance perceived as incapable of confronting Israeli aggression and falling short of playing the necessary role in aiding Palestinians in Gaza. This might lead to popular reactions in the Arab environment, akin to those following the 2008-2009 war.
The region, which the United States was aiming to move towards stability and cooperation among its allies, enters 2024 under completely adverse conditions. This sets the stage for possible military and political escalations and perhaps new social transformations.
It comes at a time when the United States is entering a pivotal election year, which will be significantly influenced by the Middle Eastern landscape.
