While the near-daily attacks by Lebanon's Hezbollah on Israel have captured the lion's share of regional and international attention since the outbreak of the October 7th War, the focus has been primarily on whether the Lebanese-Israeli front would escalate into a second warzone. However, the attacks initiated by the Houthis off the Yemeni coast to prevent ships from reaching Israeli ports have shifted this attention to the Red Sea, now joining the list of areas where the proxy conflict between Iran, Israel, and the United States unfolds.
Although the armed groups supported by Iran in the region, such as the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, deny that their regular attacks against Israeli and American targets in the region since the war’s onset are at the behest of Tehran, the common denominator is that they all fall under what is called the "Axis of Resistance" led by Tehran.
The denial by these groups and Iran of any coordination among them in these attacks does not negate, of course, the reality that they fall within a collective response of the Iranian axis to the Israeli war on Gaza. This denial also aligns with the traditional approach Iran has maintained in its relations with its allies in the region for many years, which is based on avoiding any direct Iranian role in the military movements of its proxies.
Since the war began, Iran has sought to deny any role in the attack launched by Hamas on the settlements around Gaza, but it has repeatedly warned that the continuation of Israeli attacks on Gaza could lead to the spread of the war across the Middle East.
In reality, Iran's desire to avoid direct involvement in the war does not contradict the attacks waged by its allies, designed as a means to pressure Israel and the United States to halt the war on Gaza. In South Lebanon, Hezbollah remains highly cautious about engaging in a wider war with Israel, adhering to rules of engagement that don't lead to such an outcome.
The attacks by Iran's allies in Syria and Iraq against U.S. interests were in place before the war and have significantly increased in frequency after it. So far, they have not elicited a major retaliatory U.S. response, due to Tehran and Washington's consensus to avoid escalating the conflict.
Even as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea bring the risks of a regional war, the group lacks the desire, capability, or both, to provoke a war in a region vital to both regional and global economies.
Besides seeking to raise economic costs on Israel and the global economy through their Red Sea attacks in response to the Gaza war, the military posturing of the Houthi group, Hezbollah, and other armed groups in Iraq and Syria, also serve as a showcase of Iran's regional power.
Many U.S. allies remain reluctant to participate in the security coalition formed in the Red Sea to stop Houthi attacks, fearing being drawn into a regional war.
The prevailing assumption—and it seems largely realistic—is that Iran, which tries to balance military pressure through its proxies to halt the war on Gaza and prevent its regional spread, ultimately found that avoiding a wider involvement of Hezbollah in the war and encouraging, perhaps even supporting, the Houthis to launch attacks in the Red Sea, achieves this Iranian balance.
Because Hezbollah's attacks on Israel haven't achieved their intended goals to alter the dynamics of the war and compel Israel and the U.S. to consider the risks of continuing the war, extending the confrontation to the Red Sea reflects the activation of other options for Tehran and its allies to increase pressure on Israel and the U.S.
There are other, more significant reasons explaining why the Iranian axis relies more heavily on the Red Sea front than on the Lebanese front. On one hand, wide engagement of Hezbollah in the war means it has already become regional in nature, which contradicts Iranian strategy.
Furthermore, Hezbollah doesn't appear ready to engage in a major war with Israel considering its steep costs on both the group and on Lebanon, already suffering from a severe economic crisis; such a conflict would pose existential threats to Iran's strongest ally in the region and increase the risks of direct Iranian involvement in the conflict.
On the other hand, heating up the Red Sea waters indeed raises economic costs on Israel and U.S. interests in the region, while seeming less capable of causing a regional war. Iran believes these costs will drive the U.S. and the West to focus on avoiding a collapse in regional security. Moreover, the Red Sea front does not pose an existential threat to the Houthis in Yemen, unlike Hezbollah's situation should they decide to enter the war.
It appears that the Iranian calculations were quite realistic. Many U.S. allies in the region, like the Gulf States and Egypt—with Bahrain as an exception, participating in the security coalition—are more concerned with the risks than the potential benefits of joining the coalition. Another advantage of the Red Sea front is that it has revealed a divide between the U.S. and its Arab allies on how to approach this volatile situation.
The two main reasons preventing the Gaza war from evolving into a broader regional conflict so far are Iran's attempt to maximize the benefits of the war for showcasing its regional power without needing to deepen its proxy war engagement, and American caution in escalating the war to a regional level. Tehran primarily sees the strength of its allies in the region as a deterrent in its conflict with Israel and the United States.
Thus, Iranian expectations from this strategy continue to operate according to Tehran calculations. Nevertheless, the risks of the war spreading in the region are increasing, and the Iranian balance and American caution alone may not be sufficient to limit these risks and keep them under control.
