Occupation Forces Assassinate Second in Command of Hamas: Sheikh Saleh Al-Arouri's Killing Marks a Dangerous Turn and Unprecedented Escalation
Occupation forces have carried out the assassination of the second man in Hamas, Deputy Head of its Political Bureau, Sheikh Saleh Al-Arouri, placing the region at a perilous juncture with unforeseen escalation potentials.
Al-Arouri
On the evening of Tuesday, January 2, without openly claiming responsibility, the occupation forces assassinated Sheikh Saleh Al-Arouri along with two other leaders of the Qassam Brigades – Samir al-Findi and Azzam al-Akar – and four members of the movement. This occurred in the southern suburb of the Lebanese capital Beirut; within a stronghold and a region under Hezbollah's influence.
"Israel's" threat of assassinating Al-Arouri is not new, predating the "Deluge of al-Aqsa" battle. Al-Arouri was held responsible for the recent escalation of operations in the West Bank and for rocket attacks from southern Lebanon that began during the "Sword of Jerusalem" battle in 2021. In fact, his final meeting before the start of the "Deluge of al-Aqsa" was regarding threats from the "Israeli" government to assassinate him.
These threats re-emerged during the current aggression, with Hebrew reports stating that Netanyahu has tasked Mossad with killing Hamas leaders in Lebanon, Qatar, and Turkey, naturally putting Al-Arouri, a key target, at the forefront.
The assassination operation is a significant event, arguably the first of its kind in Beirut for more than three or four decades. Al-Arouri was no ordinary man in Hamas or for Hezbollah.
Al-Arouri is viewed as a legal reference, given his academic background. He also spent nearly two decades in captivity, is a shrewd political and strategic mind, co-founded the "Qassam Brigades" in the West Bank, and led the West Bank district in his movement. He has long served as Deputy Head of the movement's Political Bureau.
He previously orchestrated the internal Palestinian dialogue and stood as a critical link between Hamas, the Iranian axis, and Hezbollah, living in Hezbollah's stronghold in the southern suburb of Beirut. He was one of the prominent proponents of the "unity of battlegrounds" concept.
The longer the war drags on, the narrower Netanyahu's options become, especially with the failure to achieve any of the war's primary goals. This time constraint only adds pressure, pushing Netanyahu and his partners to search for any semblance of victory or achievement.
Motivations
Many questions are surrounding the assassination concerning the personality, timing, context, and nature of the operation. One of the primary inquiries relates to America's role in it.
There are two theories regarding Washington's role; the first suggesting it was complicit in the operation, with the announcement of the withdrawal of the aircraft carrier "Ford" from the Mediterranean as a part of the related deception. The second leans more toward an entirely "Israeli" operation with Washington only being informed during the execution. Notably, American officials quickly disclaimed the operation, denying any American participation or even prior knowledge.
Given the available information, the second possibility seems more likely – that Washington was aware of the operation shortly before or during its execution. However, this does not imply opposition or protests from the U.S. against "Israel," as the American administration had previously offered a substantial reward for information leading to Al-Arouri.
Another question revolves around motivations. Netanyahu faced multiple and complex pressures. Domestically, public opinion and especially families of prisoners held by the Palestinian resistance were pressing for an end to the war and the return of captives through negotiation.
Moreover, there were internal pressures from some of his government partners and the military and security establishment. Several contradictions and disagreements became public, with Netanyahu convening security meetings without the Shin Bet and Mossad leaders, Defense Minister Gallant boycotting his news conference, and the military establishment's leaks pressuring the government and Netanyahu specifically.
The third pressure point is the American push towards altering the war's pattern, reducing the level of killing and destruction, and setting the stage for post-war Gaza. This was a fundamental point of contention between Washington and Tel Aviv.
As such, as the war persists, Netanyahu's options shrink further, particularly with the massive failure to achieve any declared primary war goals. The limited timeframe increases the pressure on Netanyahu and his partners, driving them to seek any snapshot of triumph or accomplishment.
Here, it's essential to underline the U.S. endeavor since the war's outset to contain it within Gaza against Hamas, avoiding a broader regional confrontation, especially involving Hezbollah in Lebanon, versus Netanyahu's intention to widen it and involve Washington in a regional conflict, which, theoretically, would enhance the prospects of victory and decrease his responsibility for its outcomes.
Thus, the assassination's goals seem to be an attempt to achieve a dual victory against Hamas and Hezbollah, a final push to draw the United States into a broader regional confrontation, and an effort to market this "achievement" before shifting the war mode or transitioning to what the occupation calls "the third stage," to convince the Zionist society of its necessity.
Despite the above, it's crucial never to dismiss the possibility of haste, confusion, or even recklessness in such a decision. This tendency has characterized the occupation's political and military leadership since the war began, and it appears that they failed to accurately gauge the event's gravity and its consequences.
Outcomes
The aforementioned facts and the occupation's avoidance of officially claiming the assassination (as of writing this) lessen the chances of Netanyahu ending the ground operation or swiftly transitioning it to a new phase based on this significant "achievement."
Hamas and the Qassam Brigades' response to the assassination of their leader may not deviate from the context of the ongoing war in the Gaza Strip. However, there's also a potential escalation in the West Bank, Al-Arouri's birthplace.
Therefore, two primary scenarios seem plausible. The first involves containing the assassination's repercussions, maintaining the current engagement rules. The second entails an expansion of the confrontation, specifically in southern Lebanon, due to responses to the assassination.
Until the assassination, Hezbollah maintained a certain level of involvement in battle, and discipline in the rules of engagement, neither allowing Gaza to be completely isolated nor provoking a comprehensive war with the occupation.
Now, although it may not directly benefit Hezbollah to escalate — considering the occupation initiated the assassination and is presumably more prepared for the responses, snatching the element of surprise from Hezbollah, and Netanyahu's primary goal from the start has been to widen the confrontation — Hezbollah appears compelled to respond.
Al-Arouri isn't an ordinary figure within Hamas or to Hezbollah, and in the southern suburb – within what could be considered Hezbollah's "hospitality" and under its protection – it falls to Hezbollah to ensure the area's security.
Nasrallah, the General Secretary of Hezbollah, previously vowed a "strong reaction" to any assassinations on Lebanese soil. Plus, Al-Arouri has long theorized and advocated for the concept of "unity of battlegrounds" among all resistance factions.
Hezbollah's statement of condolence alludes to this as it speaks of "the war between the enemy and the axis of resistance," describing the assassination as "a serious breach of Lebanon's sovereignty and security" and assuring "it will not pass without a response and punishment," declaring "this eventful day will be followed by consequential days." Hence, Hezbollah seems obligated to respond, and the statement binds them to that, regardless of the manner, timing, and location of the response.
Hezbollah's retort to Al-Arouri's assassination may come quickly or might be delayed slightly; it could be a direct military response (the most probable) or an indirect security operation, each having its own set of options and variables concerning the forms, timings, and places.
In any case, Hezbollah's anticipated retort is poised to be a leading factor in influencing whether the situation post-Al-Arouri's assassination will head toward containment of engagement or a broader confrontation.
