Military expert and strategist Major General Fayez Al-Dweiri described the ambush carried out by the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades – the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) – against the invading Israeli forces south of the Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza as successful, unprecedented, and time-extensive.
During his analysis for Al Jazeera, Al-Dweiri clarified that the success of the ambush depended on the objective, availability of information, and then the precise planning. He noted that the Qassam Brigades had to deal with a reinforced Israeli force that could be supplied at any moment, whereas their fighters operate within a tight timeframe with no room for error.
He pointed out that the video released by the Qassam Brigades did not exceed 3 minutes, but the operation took a long time. He revealed that the area south of the Zeitoun neighborhood had been in contact with Israeli forces since the first week of the Israeli ground operation.
Al-Dweiri elaborated that the Qassam ambush was divided into three groups: the duty group that targeted the encroaching Israeli force with anti-tank projectiles followed by machine gunfire; the support group that provided the required fire support to the first group.
He mentioned the existence of a cut-off group tasked with preventing any reinforcements from reaching the target. This group chose a spot to wait for rescue forces and attacked a vehicle before detonating an explosive device through a tunnel.
Al-Dweiri also commended the video of the Islamic Jihad fighters targeting an entrenched special Israeli force in a house in Khan Yunis, south of the Gaza Strip, saying that they have previously engaged in two significant military battles with the Israeli occupation. Their weaponry is somewhat different from that of the Qassam Brigades.
Field Developments
Regarding the latest field developments, Al-Dweiri reported that the occupation had shifted northward to concentrated targeting, recalling media reports about a 60% to 90% withdrawal of the force's size that entered the area after pulling two major divisions and retaining only a paratrooper brigade, Nahal brigade, and the Yahalom unit specialized in tunnels, along with two small elite forces groups.
He confirmed that the occupation had failed to destroy the tunnel network in the northern part of the Strip and to free captured soldiers, pulling out most of the forces it had deployed since the beginning of the ground war.
In central Gaza, according to Al-Dweiri, the occupation made adjustments after initially assigning the task to the "36th Armored Division," before reassigning it to the "99th Division," reinforced with four brigades, and allocating one brigade for each camp, referring to the separation and isolation of Al-Bureij, Al-Maghazi, Al-Nuseirat, and Al-Zawayda camps from each other.
He explained that the occupation conducted a maneuver starting from Al-Zahra towers south of Gaza towards Al-Zawayda, aiming to separate Al-Zawayda and Al-Maghazi from Deir al-Balah, which had yet to enter the battle.
Regarding the southern part of the Strip, the operation in Khan Yunis remains ongoing at full force, as the occupation aims to encircle the city from the southern side due to the fierce resistance in Al-Qarara and Khuza'a, by developing operations from the Fakhari area towards Khirbat Al-Adas, as the military expert described.
Al-Dweiri estimated the size of the Israeli forces in Khan Yunis to be eight combat brigades strengthened by two additional brigades. He disclosed that the battles in the city were fiercer than in the north, due to the nature of the region and the presence of elite forces from other resistance factions besides the Qassam Brigades and a joint operations room. He confirmed that the battle management in the south was centralized, unlike in the north.
