Occupied Jerusalem – An investigative report by “Yedioth Ahronoth” newspaper has uncovered further evidence supporting claims that the Israeli military employed the “Hannibal Protocol” from the onset of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle. This invoked aerial and artillery fire towards Palestinian resistance vehicles and Israeli homes in the “Gaza Envelope” settlements, including targeting the “Super Nova” music festival, putting the lives of both soldiers and Israeli civilians at risk, resulting in some fatalities.
According to the investigation published in the “Saturday Supplement” by investigative journalist and military and intelligence affairs specialist Ronen Bergman, the adoption of the Hannibal Directive occurred amidst chaos and confusion on the field without the troops and pilots reverting back to the Israeli military’s high command or the General Staff.
The Spirit of Hannibal
The application of the controversial Hannibal Protocol in the Israeli military has resurfaced, which allows for preventing kidnappings even at the expense of killing the hostage, whether they are soldiers or civilians. Despite having been repeatedly canceled since 2000 due to reservations by the majority of the Israeli army’s chiefs of staff, the protocol has haunted the Israeli army since October 7, after multiple incidents of its use resulted in the death of soldiers and civilians.
However, in the last two weeks, Bergman notes that it has become clear that the Hannibal Directive, despite its cancellation and not being mentioned by name, its spirit still looms and impacts the conduct of war, particularly evident on that horrific Black Saturday. With confirmed usage, anger and protest from the relatives of the captives resurges.
Investigative findings have resolved debates and mysteries surrounding the incident at the kibbutz “Bari” house where Israeli hostages were held. Excerpts from an interview with General Barak Hiram, a top military commander in the Gaza Envelope area, revealed he ordered tanks to fire on the house holding 13 Israeli hostages—to which only one survived, and it’s probable the rest perished due to the tank’s fire.
An Israeli investigation revealed that Israeli fighter jets destroyed at least 70 Hamas vehicles despite estimations that Israeli captives were inside (Al Jazeera)
A Highly Confidential Military Order
The investigative report uncovered an ultra-secret military order from the Southern Command to all forces operating on October 7 in the combat zone of the Gaza Envelope and the western Negev to do everything, “at any cost,” to prevent Hamas forces from returning to Gaza.
Clause number 7 of this secret military order clearly stated, “The utmost priority of the attack is the defense zone and preventing attacks, enemy forces must not be allowed to retreat into the Gaza Strip, and any such attempt must be halted at any cost.”
Bergman explains that while the military order does not mention the Hannibal Protocol, the choice of words suggests that those who framed the order were well aware of the protocol’s implications to avoid any legal scrutiny over the use of “Hannibal.”
Despite estimations of Israeli captives being within the elite forces’ vehicles of the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas” along the security fence with the sector, Israeli fighter jets destroyed no less than 70 such vehicles following the order’s issue, according to the investigation.
Officials from the Israeli Air Force stated in the investigative report that they understood there was a possibility of harming the captives, whether soldiers or civilians, but there was no other choice because this was the order they had received and believed to be the right course of action.
The Hard Questions
As the dust settles on “Black Saturday,” the Israeli journalist states that difficult questions have emerged. How many captives were killed by Israeli military fire during these hours? Were these orders justifiable? What would have happened if they had not been given, for better or worse? These issues and queries are expected to engage the Israeli public for years to come.
The Hannibal Protocol was formulated back in February 1986 during the Israeli war on Lebanon, crafted by three senior officers in the Israeli military’s Northern Command at the time: Major General Yossi Peled, General Chief Gabi Ashkenazi, and Military Intelligence Commander Colonel Yaakov Amidror.
Commenting on the use of the Hannibal Protocol during the October 7 events and subsequent ground incursion, Amidror, who penned the original order, stated that the intent was to stop the kidnapping before the captive could be transferred to enemy territory. However, dropping a bomb from a plane onto a vehicle is precisely what the Hannibal Protocol advises against.
Amidror further outlined the original text of the Hannibal Protocol, stating, “During a kidnapping operation, the main mission is to rescue our soldiers from the hands of the kidnappers, even at the risk of harming our soldiers or injuring them. Light arms fire should be used to bring the kidnappers down or arrest them.”
He added, “If the car or kidnappers do not stop, sniper fire should be directed at them individually, intentionally, to harm the kidnappers, even if it means harming our soldiers. In any case, everything should be done to stop the car and not allow it to escape.”
Officers’ Interpretations
Meanwhile, Professor Asa Kasher, who authored what is known as the “Ethics Code of the Israeli Army,” shared, he encountered evidence of the army’s use of the phrase “a dead soldier is better than a kidnapped one.”
According to Kasher, since the document concerning the “Hannibal” order was secret, most soldiers who encountered the order, especially in southern Lebanon, as well as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, heard about the fire-opening instructions from their commanders or through rumors.
Naturally, Kasher says, “Many of the military field commanders gave their interpretation, which was often very broad, granting the green light to open fire to prevent the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier at any cost.”
