Two Israeli affairs political experts concur that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continues to rely on a policy of escaping his crises and failures by remaining in a gray area that does not require making decisive decisions. To this end, he has adopted a strategy of deceiving all parties, which has helped him stay in power and avoid falling so far.
Amidst intense and unprecedented bombing by the occupation forces on Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip, Netanyahu dashed the hopes of families with detainees in Gaza by informing them of the absence of what he called a suitable and relevant offer that could, from his perspective, serve as a basis to reach an agreement for the return of their relatives.
Dr. Bilal Shobaki, head of the Political Science Department at Hebron University, believes part of Netanyahu’s approach is lying to all parties to stay in the gray space where he makes no decisions—a tactic he has employed since the Aqsa Flood battle on October 7th last year.
Dr. Shobaki, while participating in the program “Gaza… What Next?” explained that this is evident through Netanyahu’s handling of various dossiers like exchange deals, the day after the war in the Gaza Strip, and even the military operation’s proceedings in the sector because he sees any decision as not satisfying all parties, hence his lack of concern in making one.
The “No Forgiveness” Phase
However, Shobaki points out that this method has become apparent to the Israeli public. Netanyahu’s insistence on remaining in this gray area is due to his realization that any decision he makes to appease the rebellious streets against him wouldn’t satisfy them, having reached the “no forgiveness” stage, and therefore, he leans on the solid right-wing base without showing any flexibility on disputed issues.
Shobaki argues that although this course of action is now obvious to all parties, it constitutes a successful formula for Netanyahu in the long run, as he has thus far succeeded in holding onto his position of power. He indicates that part of the opposition seems complicit because they could change the political scene through more daring steps concerning their presence in the war council.
The expert in Israeli affairs justifies this by pointing to opinion polls suggesting their continued presence serves to increase their popularity at the expense of Netanyahu, and perhaps their thinking is based on pushing him to continue his missteps until he eventually falls.
Regarding the movements of the families, Shobaki sees three progressing levels. The first was in line with the general momentum toward the military operation and the belief in its success in freeing the detainees. The second, after failing to achieve this, began to doubt the military operation and its leadership. Finally, it has led to personalizing the issue.
Shobaki believes Netanyahu chooses between two issues: either a swift death by stopping the war and going through inevitable political changes within Israel that would topple him in light of all considerations that see this cessation as a defeat for Israel, or a slow death by prolonging the war in hopes of a future miracle.
A Struggle of Two Titles
Meanwhile, writer and Israeli affairs specialist Ehab Jabarin suggests that Netanyahu is caught in a struggle of two titles. The first is “Master of Security,” which he gave to himself, adopting a strategy that avoids plunging Israel into any long-term battle, thereby aiming to slowly kill the Palestinian cause with recurring tensions without escalation.
The second title, bestowed by the Israeli public, is “liar son of a liar,” under which he suffers a crisis of confidence, no longer trusted by the public who see him as leading a battle that does not bring security but rather is pursued to escape forward.
Jabarin interprets Netanyahu’s escalation of his ground campaign and lack of response to the demands of the prisoners’ families as a return to square one. He points out that Netanyahu runs wars and fronts by proxy, attempting to appear as one who meets the demands of segments of the Israeli public, including some of the prisoners’ families themselves.
Jabarin notes that the dynamics push towards more significant escalations against Netanyahu. The discharging of reserve soldiers would increase the protest movement against him in the streets. Those sectors were the core of protests prior to the events of October 7th, and hence he attempts to preempt that with rigidity around a shared objective: the refusal to allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state.
