Understanding the Resistance Axis: Hezbollah’s Tactics and Engaging Rules
Al Jazeera Net has published a comprehensive file entitled “Resistance Axis: Idea & Limits,” which delves into the concept of the axis and its founding implications, the history of its formation, and the encompassing contexts.
The file also addresses the parties within the axis and their associations with its nucleus, the spaces in which they operate, and the dynamics of polarization and discord among its components and surroundings.
The file also explores the axis’s relationship with Palestinian resistance, particularly in Gaza, highlighting the involvement of Hamas, particularly its military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, in the battle “Flood of Al-Aqsa” against the ongoing Israeli aggression for 110 days.
The file will be published as a series of episodes. It begins with a discussion on Iran as the nucleus of this axis, then delves into Syria as its pivotal hub, followed by an examination of how the Houthi movement reached the sea. When it comes to Hezbollah, the file will address the strategy of attack within the rules of engagement.
The file also delves into the Iraqi militias affiliated with the axis from their inception to the “Flood” operation.
The article then focuses on Hezbollah’s engagement when it comes to its attack strategy within the rules of engagement.
Hezbollah: Striking Within the Rules of Engagement
The surprising “Flood of Al-Aqsa” operation on the morning of October 7th was not only a shock to the Israeli occupation, but also to the allies of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the region, particularly Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon—an affirmation echoed by high-level political and military figures on both sides.
However, since the second day of the battle, Hezbollah announced its targeting of Israeli military positions in the Shebaa Farms area. These strikes indicated the party’s participation in the battle, albeit within the limits of the defined rules of engagement.
Despite weeks of ongoing strikes, targeting expanded to within 3 kilometers of the border between occupied Palestine and Lebanon, leaving the situation shrouded in mystery regarding Hezbollah’s role in the war.
However, this mystery was clarified on November 8th, when Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered a long-awaited speech, stating that Southern Lebanon represents a “front of solidarity and support” for the Palestinian resistance in Gaza. While keeping the options open between continued operations in a gradual context or engaging in a broader war, he set implicit conditions for escalation and entry into war.
Throughout the confrontations between Hezbollah and the Israeli army, the party’s operations focused on targeting Israeli forces, intelligence agencies, and camps and bases in areas surrounding Southern Lebanon. In response, the Israeli forces carried out airstrikes on Lebanese civilian homes and establishments. These attacks led the party to use new weapons such as volcanic rockets and targeted settlements, as demonstrated in missile strikes on the Kiryat Shmona settlement.
As a result of these attacks, over 230,000 settlers evacuated from northern occupied Palestine, according to the Wall Street Journal, while, according to the UN Development Program, over 64,000 Lebanese from Southern Lebanon were displaced, following approximately 91 villages being subjected to about 1,786 attacks. Since the start of the fighting, 133 members of the party were killed.
Simultaneously, the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, and the Al-Quds Brigades, the military wing of the Islamic Jihad Movement, as well as Lebanese groups such as the Lebanese Islamic Jamaa, carried out similar operations, affirming the strength of coordination and the evolving relationship between these factions in recent years.
The Southern Lebanon front during the “Flood of Al-Aqsa” signified the potential for a larger conflagration and possibly the outbreak of a war, amidst the announcement of settler communities dislocated after these operations, noting that their residents would not return until Hezbollah was removed from the border.
This was compounded by media leaks about pressures and contacts from various parties, including the United States and France, in an effort to persuade the Lebanese state to achieve this goal within the framework of implementing UN resolutions—assertions that the leaders of the party have, until now, deemed unattainable.
Establishment of the Party
The Israeli army’s invasion of Southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa, culminating in the siege of Beirut from June 1982, with the aim of destroying the capabilities of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and expelling its forces from Lebanese territory, represented a strategic event on various levels, including the maturation of conditions for the emergence of a new Shia Islamic movement. This was comprised of youths who were associated with different movements, including the Amal Movement founded by Imam Musa Sadr, and who were influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini.
The party’s relationship with the “Supreme Jurisprudent,” represented by Khomeini, began with its founding and ideological influence, followed by the opening of political and religious ties. Following the invasion, a committee representing the scholarly assembly in the Bekaa, Islamic committees, the Islamic Movement of Amal, and others convened and drafted a document known as the “Document of the Nine.” They then carried it to the Iranian leader as their “jurist,” who approved it and granted them his “religious consent.” After deliberations on the name of the newborn organization, they settled on “Hezbollah.”
Iran then dispatched a delegation from its military institution, headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to Lebanon. Some of them established a camp in the “Janta” area to train the first generation of party fighters, including the former Secretary-General, Abbas Al-Moussawi, who was killed in an Israeli assassination operation in 1992.
The party’s relations with the Iranian state in that period focused on individuals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including Mohsen Rezai, and the ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipour, and Ali Khamenei, who was appointed by Imam Khomeini to coordinate with the party.
This relationship was multi-dimensional, and the “Supreme Jurisprudent” represented a reference for the party on issues that it believed needed to be approached from a “legal perspective,” such as the blockade imposed by the Israeli army on villages in Southern Lebanon following the martyrdom operation of Ali Safi Al-Din in 1984. At that time, dissatisfaction surfaced from other factions over the price paid by families after these operations, prompting the party to seek the opinion of Khomeini, who stated that military operations should continue.
Amidst the party’s conflict with the Amal Movement in the late 1980s, known as the “War of the Brothers,” where Iran served as an advocate and defender of the party to the Syrian administration, which the Amal Movement represented as an ally in Lebanon.
Under the Shadow of the Quds Force
During the years of combat between Hezbollah and the Israeli army, which remained in different areas of Southern Lebanon and the Western Bekaa until their liberation in May 2000, relations between the party and the Quds Force in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, responsible for coordinating with the party and the factions allied with Iran in the region and Palestinian resistance forces, were strong. The compromise of the force was to supply the party with arms, provide combat training to its ranks, coordinate in the planning and development of the combat operations.
In 1998, when General Qasem Soleimani took over the leadership of the Quds Force, he played a pivotal role in the relationship with the party. He started his missions by heading towards Lebanon and familiarizing himself with the party’s leaders, visiting its sites that were facing the occupied region from the south, and nurturing solid relationships with the party’s leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, Imad Mughniyeh, Mustafa Badreddine, and others. He furthered the course of strengthening the party’s strength and developing its combat operations in the following years.
Over the years until his assassination in 2020, Soleimani was central in coordinating with Hezbollah on different fronts they joined together, even in relationships with the Palestinian factions and those in Iraq and the areas Iran engaged and invested in the war on Syrian soil.
Maintaining Ties with Palestinian Factions
In parallel with the multi-dimensional relations with Iran, key figures in the party maintained relations with Palestinian factions, including Fatah, and at the forefront, President Yasser Arafat. Emad Mughniyeh, along with Abu Hassan Salameh and others from the party, who were engaged in ties with the Palestinian revolution during their presence in Lebanon, saw the return of Palestinian forces to occupied territory after the Oslo Accords in 1993 as an opportunity to continue communications aimed at supplying the Palestinians with weapons and support resistance against the Israeli occupation.
The outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 marked a complete engagement of the party alongside the regime and Iran and their allies. According to Iranian General Hossein Hamadani in his memoir “Fish Messages,” Hassan Nasrallah played a central role in evaluating events in Syria and forming plans to deal with them.
The party pushed for coordination with Soleimani to send forces to Syria and killed a number of its historical leaders in battles. This participation was not restricted to Syrian land. The party announced that its leaders participated in support of Iraqi militias in the face of ISIS, which overran vast areas of Iraq, starting from 2014.
The events in the Levant combined with the dramatic changes in Yemen, with the rise of the Houthi Ansar Allah group allied with Iran, signify a pivotal stage for the formation of what later became a solid concept in Arab and international political and media discussions: “the Resistance Axis.”
Did “Unity of Arenas” See the Light?
Despite the deterioration of relations between Hamas and the Syrian regime and Iran due to their stance on the Syrian revolution, the relations between the movement, the party, and Iran remained alive, as affirmed by leaders of the movement, especially in terms of the relationships with the Al-Qassam Brigades.
In the years following 2015, relations between Hamas, the party, and Iran returned to a path of strengthening, culminating in the concept of “Unity of Arenas,” dated 2021 and following the “Sword of Jerusalem” battle. This concept has yet to take a substantive form, despite being nascent, in military and field developments.
While the interventions within defined combat rules by Hezbollah and Islamic factions in Iraq and the Houthi group in Yemen can be read as expressions of “Unity of Arenas,” it remained within the context of confrontation only and did not escalate into a comprehensive war.
The complex reality brought about by the “Flood of Al-Aqsa” battle presented complications in terms of the relationships between the parties within the axis. Hezbollah, which declared that its duty was to ensure “Hamas is not defeated,” launched a series of operations against the occupation’s positions along the Lebanese border, appearing to operate within known rules of combat and lines that were not precisely defined as to when to surpass them and expand operations.
A careful study of the party’s history reveals its inclination towards building relations in the region with various forces, especially those supporting the resistance line. This pattern is central to its strategic philosophy, running parallel to its deep-rooted political, social, and historical ties within Lebanon and historical connections to the Palestinian cause. This makes an analysis of its positions without these considerations often imprecise.
While the party has different dimensions in this relationship, from adherence on a religious level to “Supreme Jurisprudence” to high-level political and military coordination with Iran, it also has societal and historical Lebanese dimensions, and a historical connection to the Palestinian cause. This multifaceted relationship reveals the party’s independent capacity in analysis and decision-making.
