Occupied Jerusalem – Military and political analysts have reached a consensus that the Israeli military has failed to achieve the declared objectives of the war on Gaza. The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is struggling to make a decision on the progress of the ground operation and the mechanisms for liberating detainees held by the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).
These assessments come at a time when protests by the families of the detainees are expanding in Tel Aviv, demanding a comprehensive exchange deal. There is talk of an agreement between Hamas and Israel on a negotiation process for a new exchange deal.
Hamas demands an immediate ceasefire, while Netanyahu insists on the military option to free the Israeli detainees.
Scenes from the engagement of Qassam brigades’ fighters with occupation vehicles and soldiers in the axes of Gaza city (social media platforms).
🚨 10 Israeli soldiers taken out in a single hit + more combat footage released by al Qassam brigades.
These videos are exceptional combat journalism, and expose the Israeli ground troops as a TikTok army that cannot contend with a well trained resistance of guerilla fighters. pic.twitter.com/lT5jOLIVv2
— Richard Medhurst (@richimedhurst) December 18, 2023
The Failure of the Military Option
Israeli perspectives are bolstered by the belief that the military option has not led to the liberation of even one detainee, weakened Hamas’ rule or military arsenal, and instead has brought severe casualties to the occupation army in terms of soldiers killed and wounded, as well as military equipment losses.
Amidst the complexities of the war and the ground incursions, TV critic journalist Einav Schiff wrote an article in “Yedioth Ahronoth” titled “Time to Climb Down from the Tree,” implicitly acknowledging that the army failed to achieve the war goals and that Netanyahu’s government is floundering over decision-making regarding the detainees.
Journalist Schiff clarified that the killing of the three abductees by the Israeli army not only revealed severe operational failures and a lack of moral clarity but also exposed the painful and restrictive reality of ground maneuvers in the Gaza Strip.
Practically speaking, Einav says one doesn’t need to be an army officer to sense the gap between realities, field facts, and the high expectations entrenched in Israeli public consciousness.
He continues, saying that the media discourse on TV, the internet, and newspapers, with a few exceptions, obscures the harsh battlefield realities under the pretext of preserving morale and combat spirit.
Schiff believes that the political and military levels in Israel find it difficult to utter the truth, saying, “Destroying Hamas might be a good slogan, but it is not a realistic objective under current circumstances. After a month and a half of fierce fighting that no one in Israel dared to imagine, the army does not have full control over the northern sector of the Strip.”
Merely Wishes
The Israeli journalist adds, “Every day, soldiers are dying in ground battles that are taking place under very complicated and difficult conditions, despite substantial support from air and artillery forces.”
He explains that the Israeli army’s estimates on when they can proclaim full control over areas like Jabaliya and the Shuja’iyya neighborhood are merely wishes at best. In the south of the Strip, according to Israeli reports, the situation is more complicated, questioning the fate of the Rafah maneuver in light of American expectations for a change in the combat approach.
Schiff states, “The current campaign phase will not end with the destruction of Hamas, which is an unachievable Israeli declared objective, even before addressing the issue of the abductees, which is not moving in any positive direction. Ever since the resumption of fighting, none of them has returned to Israel alive.”
Israeli writer Nir Keinon echoed similar sentiments in his article on the “Walla” website titled: “Releasing the abductees or destroying Hamas? The Israeli government is unable to make a decision.”
Keinon argues that the sequence of events in Israel since “Operation Protective Edge” in October and the conduct of the war on Gaza prove that Israeli leadership is incapable of making tough decisions.
He states that the inability to resolve matters regarding the progression of the war and a new exchange deal reflects varying opinions within the Israeli government between two main camps. One camp believes that military pressure aids negotiations, and therefore, increasing pressure acts as an incentive for a deal.
Conversely, the second camp claims that the return of the abductees takes precedence over the overthrowing of Hamas rule. With these differing views, Keinon asserts, “We may have to swallow our national pride and go for a deal that makes the [Gilad] Shalit deal look like a trivial humanitarian gesture, only then can we declare a war of eradication against Hamas.”
Doubts and Floundering
Amidst this divergence and division about the course of the ground incursion and achieving war goals, Netanyahu affirms his commitment to continue fighting. However, military affairs analyst for “Haaretz” Amos Harel suggests that “doubts are leading to erosion and cracks in the Israeli public’s support for the war.”
As time progresses, the military analyst says, “The situation in Gaza could eventually resemble the aftermath of the first Lebanon War in 1982, after the occupation of Beirut, when the Israeli understanding that victory seemed possible faded. Here, in the ground incursion in Gaza, matters are also tied to a shift in the general Israeli attitude towards the war.”
Harel comments that continued combat will involve more fallen and wounded soldiers, raising doubts about achieving the declared objectives and eliminating Hamas leadership or freeing the detainees through military operations.
In assessing the Israeli political leadership’s indecisiveness about the war on Gaza, “Haaretz” Arab affairs and Middle East analyst Tzvi Barel supposes this reflects Netanyahu’s government’s deception, suggesting that Tel Aviv’s new war stage is set towards “a direct and complete occupation of the Strip.”
Without explicitly stating it, Barel opines, “Israeli strategy seems to be leaning towards mimicking an occupation model, by professing not intending to occupy Gaza but also planning no withdrawal from it, and without specifying the conditions necessary for the army withdrawal from the Strip or when that would occur.”
“There seems to be something in the ‘Destroying Hamas’ slogan,” says Barel, “that fulfills the necessary condition to end the war. Yet the sector remains filled with arms, and cross-border tunnels between Sinai and Gaza continue to play a role in the inflow of weapons and ammunition.”
He continues, “The extension of combat will last for an extended period before Israel can proclaim that Hamas’ military infrastructure no longer poses a threat.”
