How can a country, steadily heading towards a population of nearly 150 million people, live in a “geographical prison”?
“Ethiopia’s existence is tied to the Red Sea,” the issue of discussing the Red Sea should not be taboo for Ethiopians.”
Thus spoke Abiy Ahmed in his famous and dangerous speech before Parliament last October. Although within the same speech, he identified Erithrea, Somalia, or Djibouti as the routes for reaching the sea, he surprised everyone early this year by bypassing the governments of these three states and signing a memorandum of understanding with the unrecognised Republic of Somaliland granting him a 20-km perimeter in the Berbera port area for 50 years, in exchange for recognizing the Republic of Somaliland, and it acquiring a share of the Ethiopian Airlines company!
This direction raises questions regarding how this agreement differs from its predecessor, which also involved Somaliland and the global ports company DP World from the UAE in March 2018, shortly after he came to power. Under that agreement, Addis Ababa gained a 19% stake in the port of Berbera, compared to 51% for Dubai and 30% for Somaliland, in addition to developing a 260-kilometer road link between Ethiopian territories and the port. This agreement was canceled by the government of Somaliland with Addis Ababa in June 2022 due to the latter’s failure to develop this road.
It also raises another issue, equally significant in its timing – it was announced just two days after an agreement sponsored by Djibouti between Somalia and Somaliland, which stipulated the resumption of political negotiations focusing on “secession or unity”. This means the undermining of Djibouti’s efforts and negotiations concept.
Indeed, Somaliland declared in September that it would not compromise with Somalia regarding the issue of secession and independence, but would discuss with them ways to achieve this. However, this preemptive move also contributed to estrangement with the central government in Mogadishu, which had signed an agreement with Abiy Ahmed in June 2018. This included Ethiopia’s investment in four Somali maritime ports to attract foreign investments.
Moreover, they do not mind entering into such a deal with Addis Ababa, as it affirms Somali sovereignty over the region, especially in light of the close relations between the two sides, which was recently reflected in renewing a military agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia last October.
As for Djibouti and Eritrea, they initially rejected the agreement, viewing it as a potential threat to their sovereignty, as well as its economic impact on the Ethiopian trade revenues that used to pass through these ports.
Motives Behind Ethiopia’s Drive Towards The Red Sea
The latest agreement with Somaliland – despite the scarcity of information regarding it – is different from the 2018 agreement in being a sovereign agreement that gives Addis Ababa freedom of movement in this region. It also opens up the possibility of establishing a naval base close to Bab el-Mandeb (“the southern gateway”) at the Red Sea. This may clarify why the agreement contemplates the potential recognition of Somaliland not yet internationally recognized. Abiy Ahmed seems to have played on this, exploiting at the same time Musa Bihi Abdi’s – president of Somaliland’s completed term last November – quest to achieve economic or political milestones that could contribute to his victory in the upcoming elections.
Internal and External Motives Behind Ethiopia’s Red Sea Ambitions
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Firstly, a desire by Abiy Ahmed to achieve his imperial ambitions that surpass his country’s landlocked limits, aiming for regional dominance. In a speech in 2018, he didn’t conceal this imperial dream, stating his mother told him when he was 7 that he was destined to become the seventh divinely appointed emperor to unify and rule Ethiopia; with the number 7, from Genesis to Revelation, representing perfection. He aims to repeat Emperor Haile Selassie’s imperialistic dream from the 1940s of annexing Eritrea by force to reach the Red Sea. His speech in October explicitly stated that Ethiopia has “natural rights” to direct access to the Red Sea and if deprived of these “rights”, “there would be no justice, and no justice… it’s a matter of time, we will fight.”
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Secondly, to control the five main ports in his project of uniting the Horn of Africa into an economic bloc, wherein a naval force plays a prominent role. This explains his focus two years ago on reviving the navy through an agreement with France after it was disbanded in 1996, three years following Eritrea’s independence, rendering the country landlocked. This also points to his focus early in his term on signing economic agreements concerning ports with broader Horn of Africa countries, including a deal with Somalia over four coastal ports on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, and with Eritrea for developing a road facilitating goods transit to the port of Assab on the Red Sea.
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Thirdly, to reduce fees for using the port of Djibouti, which costs the country nearly two billion dollars annually, in addition to the international competition Djibouti faces which has become a hub for global powers: “USA, France, China”. This raises the fear that this competition might affect his country’s foreign trade.
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Fourthly, to increase foreign investments and generally improve economic conditions after an economic growth rate decline from 9% in 2019 to almost 5% the previous year, largely affected by the COVID-19 crisis and the Tigray War.
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Fifthly, warmed relations with Eritrea due to Eritrea’s rejection of the Pretoria Agreement signed with the Tigray Front in November 2022 to cease the war, in addition to rumors of Asmara’s support for Amhara’s Fano Front in its recent war against the regime, along with renewed rapprochement “again” between Eritrea and the Egyptian regime.
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Sixth, to gain the favor of the international community after criticisms over the Tigray War and to win over Washington, which seeks to dismantle the Eritrean-Ethiopian alliance after Asmara’s turn towards Moscow and Beijing, and their alluding to offering Russia a base on the Red Sea.
- Seventh, the desire to have his country join the Red Sea Forum established in 2020, which includes 8 countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia) after a previous membership request was rejected. Therefore, Abiy Ahmed announced in February 2022 that the security of the Red Sea is not feasible without Ethiopia’s participation in preserving its strategic interests in far-off regions over the next fifteen years. He might also aim for a footing in the coalition currently being formed by the United States to counter Houthi attacks in Bab el-Mandeb, thus increasingly winning the favor of Washington and Tel Aviv alike.
Potential Outcomes of The Agreement
The first practical reaction to the agreement came from Somalia, who declared it null and void, affecting their sovereignty. However, they haven’t specified the next steps. Will they escalate the matter to the African Union whose charter refuses to compromise national sovereignty? Or will they bring it to the United Nations? Moreover, they haven’t yet decided whether to proceed with the implementation of the 2018 agreement involving the four ports with Addis Ababa or to cancel it.
The Somali reaction is controlled by various considerations: mainly the difficulty of waging a war against Ethiopia while Mogadishu is preoccupied with Al-Shabaab. Indeed, Mogadishu relies on Addis Ababa for support against Al-Shabaab through its participation in the African Union forces there, “ATMIS”.
As for Djibouti and Eritrea, they primarily rejected the agreement, viewing it as a potential threat to their sovereignty and its economic impact on the Ethiopian trade revenues passing through these ports. Eritrea might fear the agreement is an attempt to revive Emperor Haile Selassie’s idea of controlling Assab, while Djibouti considers it undermining their diplomatic efforts regarding Somali reconciliation.
This latest agreement might lead to the possibility of the three states: “Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti” forming an alliance against Ethiopia. If such a coalition occurs, it will depend on numerous factors, including Ethiopian assurances to these states and the extent of support they receive from Washington and Moscow. Undoubtedly, if this coalition happens, it would signify a shift from Abiy Ahmed’s policy of “zero problems” upon taking office, to “uniting the adversaries” in a single coalition due to the imperial dream and the desire for regional dominance.
