As the "Israeli" aggression on the Gaza Strip continues beyond eighty days, accompanied by the steadfastness of its people and the valiance of the Palestinian resistance, new aspects, and additional considerations of the war and its repercussions emerge over time. Pertinent among these is the future of the occupying state's presence in the region.
A Different Battle
The current war on the Gaza Strip presents a fundamental dilemma for assessment since it is entirely different from all previous confrontations. There is no previous model to build upon or rely on for evaluation and projection.
Despite the occupation state having launched several wars on the Strip in 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014, and despite the Palestinian resistance initiating the 2021 confrontation (the Battle of the Sword of Jerusalem), the differences with the current "Al-Quds Flood" war are numerous, profound, and fundamental.
The form of the battle stands at the forefront of these differences. The Qassam Brigades initiated an offensive form – with defensive objectives – utilizing weapons and tools and targeting goals far removed from those associated in previous military confrontations, specifically by imposing the battle on "enemy territory."
Additionally, the unprecedented brutality with which "Israel" conducts its military operations in the Gaza Strip, particularly against civilians, has been described by many as war crimes and genocide.
The striking resemblance between some of the current developments and the events of the Zionist project on Palestinian land has led many to liken the current war to the 1948 Nakba, dubbing it the Second Nakba.
The objectives of the military operation, especially the ground operation as declared by the occupation and others from political and military statements and analyses, aim to end Hamas's rule in the Strip, plans for the displacement and the depopulation of its residents, and its termination as a political case with the intention of re-occupation if possible.
The occupation views the battle as an existential war tied to its long-term fate, hence it seeks to restore deterrence by incurring the maximum number of losses. Its tolerance for losses has increased compared to previous confrontations.
Another stark difference is the "Western stance" supporting the occupation led by the United States, which regards the war as its own, contrasted with an Arab-Islamic stance described at best as impotent in relieving or aiding Gaza, with some regimes bordering on complicity and harmony with "Israeli" objectives specifically concerning Hamas.
Facts
All the foregoing leads to caution and reservation in assessing, projecting, and foreseeing the war, its paths, results, and future outcomes. The current war conditions cannot be seen as anything more than an attempt at generalized interpretation.
However, certain matters and significant developments can still be observed, including some facts related to the Zionist entity project since its establishment and concerning its future in the region.
The resistance's documentation of direct confrontations between its fighters and occupation soldiers highlights the vast difference in courage, boldness, and morale, directly reflecting the outcomes of these encounters in which the occupation cannot capitalize on its air superiority and military hardware prowess.
The significant similarity between some current developments and the historical events of the Zionist project in Palestinian territories has prompted many to compare the current war to the 1948 Nakba, calling it the Second Nakba. Key incidents include the occupation leaders' perspective on the Palestinian people, denying their existence as a united entity on one hand and dehumanizing them to justify targeting them on the other.
Prominent examples include President "Israeli" Isaac Herzog's assertion that "there are no innocent people in Gaza" to justify crimes against civilians and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant's description of the Palestinians or the resistance as "subhumans." This is compounded by soldiers and officers' celebration of killing children and targeting homes, as well as some media personalities calling for the killing of hundreds of thousands of Gazans for their peace of mind.
The current war has revived memories of the massacres and slaughters committed by Zionist gangs in the 1930s and 1940s, repeated by the occupation army today without concern for international law, public opinion criticisms, or international organization appeals.
The situation also involves blockades, starvation, and field assassinations of unarmed civilians aimed at deportation and depopulating the land to enforce a new status quo in the Strip and a desperate attempt to reduce external pressures and make unfounded claims of not targeting civilians.
One of the war's most revealing aspects is the occupation state's reliance on foreign support, seemingly vital for its survival, including direct military assistance and armament supplies from Western countries, particularly the United States, despite not being at war with another state or group but waging an asymmetrical war against a resistance movement.
All this underscores the occupation state's need for strong propaganda and deceitful narratives to protect itself and maintain its existence, with myths about the invincible army, all-knowing intelligence services, and heavily armed and technologically advanced soldiers.
An Existential War
In summary, the occupation — despite its military, economic, and technical dominance in the region — relies on external support in all fields while engaged in a war against a well-experienced resistance movement. It weaves myths of strength and superiority for protection and psychological warfare.
Moreover, the occupation excels only in the killing of civilians, while after more than eighty days of savage aggression that knows no bounds, it still desperately chases an illusory, if not fictitious, achievement against Palestinian resistance.
Indeed, documenting the resistance's direct clashes with soldiers exposes a significant disparity in valor and resolve, which directly impacts the outcomes of these engagements where the occupation benefits naught from its aerial and field hardware superiority.
This implies that the occupation state can be defeated, especially if faced by a force(s) with the will, determination, planning, and preparation. If a besieged resistance with minimal capabilities and no regional support can perform militarily like this, we can only imagine what other forces and states might achieve.
Importantly, the war has revealed that "Israeli" society is not a people in the traditional sense, as claimed. Despite assertions, they lack a shared history and unified identity and are instead disparate, sometimes contradictory groups collected from various nations without truly melding into a homogeneous populace, much less one bound by cause, as the Palestinians are.
Moreover, the war reinstates the known and reaffirmed fact that the surrounding world rejects the occupation state — nearly unanimously at the public level and partially officially. Consequently, the promised utopia for world Jewry in Palestine regarding welfare and security no longer exists and may never return, particularly in terms of confidence in the state and its military and security institutions.
The foundations upon which the Zionist project in Palestine was established are no longer as they once were. Some have vanished, others have receded, and the rest are uncertain long-term, indicating the project's fall and casting its future into uncertainty.
Thus, it may be that the most truthful statement made by the occupation leaders in this war is that it is, in fact, an existential battle, and the long-term future of the occupation's existence in the region is not assured.
Therefore, Palestinians may believe today that liberation is no longer a far-fetched dream, a hollow emotional slogan, or an impossibility. The "Al-Quds Flood" has significantly altered many things.
