Occupied Jerusalem – An investigative report by the “Yedioth Ahronoth” newspaper revealed further evidence confirming that the Israeli military had employed the controversial “Hannibal Protocol” almost immediately during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle. This protocol includes opening fire from air and artillery towards Palestinian resistance vehicles and Israeli homes within the “Gaza Envelope” settlements, including during the “Super Nova” musical festival, and throughout the ground incursion into the Gaza Strip, endangering the lives of soldiers and Israeli civilians, and resulting in some fatalities.
According to the investigation published in the “Saturday Supplement,” prepared by investigative and military intelligence journalist Ronen Bergman, the Hannibal Directive was activated amidst chaos and confusion on the battlefield without soldiers and pilots referring back to the Israeli military’s high command and the general staff.
The Spirit of Hannibal
The Hannibal Protocol came back into effect, which has been one of the Israeli military’s most controversial orders, allowing for the use of force to prevent kidnappings at the expense of endangering, and sometimes killing, the abductees, whether they are soldiers or civilians. Although it has been canceled repeatedly since 2000 following reservations from most army chiefs of staff, it has returned to haunt the Israeli military since October 7, after its utilization was revealed in several incidents leading to the death of troops and civilians.
However, in the last two weeks, Bergman says, “It became clear that the Hannibal procedure, though officially canceled and not mentioned by name, its spirit looms and influences the conduct of the war, especially during that horrific black Saturday. Confirmation of its application has renewed anger and protest from the families of the abductees.”
The investigative report settled debates and mysteries surrounding the incident at a house in Kibbutz Bari, where Israeli hostages were held. Excerpts from an interview with General Barak Hiram, the senior military commander of the “Gaza Envelope” area, were published, where he admitted to ordering a tank to fire at the house holding 13 Israeli hostages. Only one survived, and it’s likely the others were killed by tank fire.
An Israeli investigation discovered that Israeli fighters destroyed at least 70 vehicles belonging to Hamas, despite estimates that there were Israeli hostages inside (Al Jazeera).
A Highly Secret Military Order
The investigation uncovered a highly secretive military order issued by the Southern Command to all forces operating on October 7 in the combat zones of the “Gaza Envelope” and the Western Negev, to do anything at “any cost” to prevent Hamas forces from returning to Gaza.
In item number 7 of the secret military order, it states explicitly, “The highest priority of the attack is the defense area and preventing attacks, and the enemy forces must not be allowed to withdraw to the Gaza Strip. Any attempt of this kind must be halted at any cost.”
Bergman clarified that although there is no mention of the Hannibal Protocol in the military order, the choice of words points at least to what was in the minds of those who drafted the order to avoid any legal accountability regarding the use of Hannibal.
Amid the hours following the order, Israeli fighters destroyed no fewer than 70 elite forces vehicles of the Islamic Resistance Movement “Hamas” along the security fence with the sector, even though there were estimations of Israeli hostages within the elite forces’ vehicles, according to the investigation.
Israeli Air Force officials stated during the inquiry that they were aware of the potential harm to the abductees, whether military or civilian, but there was no other option, as this was the order they received, and they believed it was the right action to take.
Tough Questions Arising
As the dust on “Black Saturday” begins to settle, the Israeli journalist said that tough questions are emerging. “How many of the hostages were killed by the Israeli army’s fire during these hours? Were such orders permissible? What would have happened if these orders hadn’t been given, for better or worse? These issues and questions will occupy the Israeli public for years to come.”
The drafting of the Hannibal Protocol dates back to February 1986 during the Israeli war on Lebanon, crafted by three top officers of the Israeli military’s Northern Command at the time: Major General Yossi Peled, General Gabi Ashkenazi, and Colonel Yaakov Amidror.
Commenting on the use of the Hannibal Protocol during the events of October 7 and the ground incursion, Amidror, who wrote the original order, said, “The intention was to stop the kidnapping before the abductee was transferred to enemy territory. However, dropping a bomb from a plane onto a vehicle is exactly what the Hannibal Directive prohibits doing.”
Amidror reviewed the wording of the Hannibal Protocol, saying “During a kidnapping operation, the main aim is to rescue our soldiers from the captors, even at the risk of harming or wounding our soldiers. Firing should commence with light weapons in order to ground the kidnappers or arrest them.”
He added, “If the vehicle or kidnappers do not stop, sniper fire should be used deliberately to harm the kidnappers, even if it means harming our soldiers. In any case, everything must be done to stop the vehicle and prevent it from fleeing.”
Officers’ Explanations
Professor Asa Kasher, who drafted what’s known as “the Code of Ethics of the Israeli Army,” mentioned encountering evidence regarding the army’s use of the rationale “a dead soldier is better than an abducted soldier.”
According to Kasher, since the document related to the Hannibal order was secret, most soldiers exposed to the order, in Southern Lebanon as well as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, heard about it from their commanders or rumors.
He noted, “Naturally, many field military commanders provided their interpretation, which often was very broad, giving the green light to shoot in order to prevent the abduction of an Israeli soldier at any price.”
