Houthis from Within: Unveiled Secrets You Don’t Know

The Houthi group is not a product of the recent two decades of Yemen’s history, as some may believe. It is not a political movement that emerged as a result of the democratic margin created by the circumstances following the unification of the southern and northern parts of Yemen in 1990. Instead, it is an extension of an Imami project planted in the province of Saada and the northern regions, which was initially established by Imam Hadi Yahya bin Al-Hussein Ar-Rass in 893 AD and later became known as the Hadawi doctrine.

Being a product of this doctrine and system that has been in place for over 1100 years, the Houthi group is based on the concept of divine selection and the exclusive leadership of the nation within the descendants of the two grandsons – Hassan and Hussein – until the Day of Judgment.

Tactical Engagement

While this ideology aligns and resonates with the Zaidi doctrine, it diverges from it in many aspects. For example, it did not adhere to the 14 conditions stipulated by the Zaidi doctrine for assuming leadership during many historical stages. This deviation was evident during the rule of the Qasimi state that governed most of Yemen, where power shifted to a hereditary monarchy. Similarly, it was apparent during the last Imamate rule in Yemen before the outbreak of the September 26 Revolution, which was supported by the late Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, in the 1960s.

The Houthis’ symbols capitalized tactically on their engagement within the republican system that followed the aforementioned revolution and the subsequent civil war, which culminated in a national reconciliation. They worked diligently to strengthen their presence in the state institutions and its sensitive facilities, as they represent the deep state in Yemen, should it be rightly described as such. Additionally, they persistently prepared the environment and conditions for their return to governing Yemen.

After the Yemeni unification, the first youth entity known as the “Youth of Faith” emerged, leveraging the apprehension of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh about the growing strength of the Reform Party or the Yemeni Brotherhood, as some preferred to call them, and the escalating discord between the two partners of the unity – the General People’s Congress chaired by Ali Saleh and the Yemeni Socialist Party led by Ali Al-Beidh. This nascent entity received implicit support from Saleh in his attempt to play on the contradictions and manipulate the situation to his advantage.

At the beginning of this century, Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi revolted against the founding partners of the “Youth of Faith” movement and took control of it. This marked the emergence of the armed group known as the “Houthi Ansar Allah” before later renaming themselves as such.

Battlefield Gains

The founder of the “Houthi Ansar Allah” – who was a member of the first parliament following the Yemeni unification, representing his electoral district – initiated his first wars against the government authorities in 2004, following prior tensions during which his supporters seized financial revenues and controlled areas within their influence in their stronghold of Saada governorate, north Yemen, due to ideological reasons. He was killed in the first round of the war in the same year.

His younger brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, assumed the leadership of the group thereafter and engaged in five subsequent wars that extended until 2010. In each round, the group achieved expansive battlefield gains and exploited both declared and undeclared differences among Ali Abdullah Saleh and his military, tribal, and political partners in the government. Their savvy political arms played a significant role in destabilizing the ruling system.

The events of the Arab Spring and the protests of Yemeni youth against the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh provided the Houthis with a valuable opportunity to manipulate the contradictions among the Yemeni forces aligned and competing with each other.

They sympathized with the southern movement and set up their tents in the squares of change alongside the youth of the revolution. Simultaneously, their interaction did not cease with the beleaguered president due to the escalating protests, and those protests, along with the resulting agreements on feeble figures to manage the transitional phase, enabled their armed takeover of Sanaa, despite their forces knocking on its doors since 2009.

Their accumulated experiences with the project they represent, the expertise and cunning of their veteran politicians, enabled them to understand the sensitivity of their neighbors and external powers and their fears of the parties and groups that emerged from the Arab Spring revolts, especially the Islamic ones, and to play on their strings.

Complex Stance

As the war in Yemen strengthened the Houthis internally, today’s American-British bombing campaigns have begun to establish their popular presence on both the Arab and Islamic levels, granting them external sympathy when they need it most. It puts their local opponents in a complex position, especially as the Palestinian issue garners consensus among all sections of the Yemeni people and its components.

There is almost no disagreement that the Houthi solidarity with Gaza and their targeting of commercial ships related to Israel or heading towards its ports – which later evolved into targeting American and British ships in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea – constitutes bold and significant actions in the course of the conflict. The Houthis reaped abundant benefits from the events in Gaza and managed to present themselves to the world as a major player in the region.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that due to these events, the Houthis discovered their own capabilities and the extent of their ability to disrupt international trade and its maritime routes.

Simultaneously, they escaped from the local obligations that almost cornered them due to the escalating popular anger caused by the deteriorating living conditions and the suspension of civil servants’ salaries since the outbreak of the war, especially with the signs of peace that emerged before the end of last year.

Special Reference

The Gaza events provided a valuable opportunity for the Houthis to demonstrate the truthfulness of their slogans that have been raised since their armed appearance at the beginning of this century. This includes “Malaazim,” the group’s founder, Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, who they describe as the Quranic speaker. He serves as the group’s intellectual reference and has signed a document with a number of Zaidi scholars in recent years, confirming a set of principles including the concept of divine selection mentioned earlier and opposition to America and Israel.

It can be said that while the Houthi group appears to be part of the Zaidi doctrine, it differs from it in many issues and has its own reference. There are those who say that they represented a rebellion against the legacy of the Zaidi doctrine in Yemen.

Regarding their relationship with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, they do not deny this relationship but rather take pride in it, displaying images of their symbols and leadership during their events and harmonizing with their ideas. They have greatly benefited from Iranian support. However, their roots date back to before the Khomeini revolution in Iran, as previously mentioned. Therefore, it is not unlikely for them to have a unique vision, especially after the recent regional and global presence they have achieved.