Is Eritrea Supporting Armed Sudanese Groups?

by Rachel
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The security concerns have been a key focus for Asmara concerning the eastern Sudan adjacent to its western and northern borders, where the region comprises of its three states, especially Kassala and the Red Sea, strategically important for Eritrea due to the long extended borders and the ethnic intersections between many tribes on both sides.

Naturally, ensuring the security and stability of the eastern states and the strategy of preventing the war from spreading to them became one of the main axes of the discussions held by Eritrean President Asias Afwerki with Malik Agar, the deputy head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council on January 17, 2024, as reported by the latter on his platform.

In this context, the establishment of training camps for Sudanese fighters on Eritrean soil is an extension of its high interest in eastern Sudan over the past three decades. According to a study published on the Al Jazeera Studies website, Eritrea has built a network of close relations with societal, political, and tribal forces that have ensured a permanent presence and influence in the region.

Moreover, Eritrean security agencies have been active in the region to monitor opposition factions and Eritrean gatherings, leading Professor John Young, a prominent expert on Sudanese affairs, to state that Asmara “possesses excellent knowledge and intelligence about the region.”

Despite Eritrea’s official silence on confirming or denying hosting Sudanese fighters, there are circulating talks about Eritrea opening camps within its territories to train armed Sudanese groups, amidst the escalation of the Sudanese conflict and its proximity to the eastern regions after the fall of the Jazeera state to the Rapid Support Forces late in December 2023.

Eritrean Preventive Efforts

In view of the above, Asmara’s reception of armed Sudanese forces represents Eritrea’s effort to establish advanced defense points in anticipation of any security chaos resulting from the conflict spreading to eastern Sudan. This could potentially leave a void for hostile parties to find and support armed Eritrean opposition moving across the long borders between the two countries, a significant portion of which consists of flat, easily navigable terrains.

These concerns are heightened by the presence of one of the largest Eritrean diaspora communities in East Sudan, with over 136 thousand refugees registered in UNHCR camps in the region, as reported in March 2023. Additionally, many residents holding Sudanese nationality, many of whom are historically affiliated with tribes opposed to Asmara.

Many international reports indicate that Eritrean refugee waves in recent years have comprised mainly of deserters who received military training under Eritrea’s national service, fleeing due to the violations within. These ex-recruits present fertile ground for any opposition military action against Asmara if a capable entity emerges for containment and recruitment, a scenario not far-fetched considering a similar attempt to establish a military front against Asmara in Khartoum led by former Eritrean Defense Minister Mesfin Hagos, revealed in July 2021.

Malik Agar Eritrea and Isaias Afwerki

Afwerki (left) expressing support for Sudan (French)

Support from the Sudanese Army

While official Eritrean discourse has maintained neutrality towards the warring parties since the conflict outbreak in mid-April 2023, recent indicators suggest a growing rapprochement between Asmara and the Sudanese army. Besides Agar’s statement expressing Eritrea’s solidarity with the “Sudanese people and government”, Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta praised Asmara’s stance regarding the crisis in his country.

In this context, hosting armed Sudanese groups is Eritrea’s support for the Sudanese army’s military effort. These groups declared their alignment with the Army and the training camps were opened following the sudden fall of the Jazeera state to the Rapid Support Forces late in December 2023.

The collapse of the stationed forces in the state led many military analysts to believe that the Sudanese armed forces were facing difficulties, prompting them to arm civilians as part of the “Armed Popular Resistance.”

Preventing Encirclement

The seizure of the Jazeera state by the Rapid Support Forces marked a geographical shift in the battles from Khartoum and the west towards the central and eastern Sudan, according to an analysis published by the Al Jazeera Studies Center in January 2024.

Within this shift, the recent Eritrean move reflects Asmara’s concerns regarding the potential of General Hemeti’s forces reaching the Ethiopian borders via the Qadarif state. This could open a supply line through Ethiopia or elsewhere, strengthening its field position, freeing it from the burden of its supply lines from the west and ensuring control over eastern Sudan.

Expanding these forces into the Kassala state and reaching Eritrea’s borders would subject the latter to a triple siege, with Ethiopia to the southwest, the Rapid Support, Addis Ababa’s ally, from the west. Its southern borders with Djibouti witness ongoing tension due to border disputes, leading to a limited war in 2008.

Considering the heightened tensions in Ethiopian-Eritrean relations, the Rapid Support’s control over the Kassala state would limit Asmara’s options. Sudan acted as a breathing space for Asmara in conflicts with Ethiopia and potentially granted Ethiopian forces a passage through Sudan to western Eritrea.

Asmara was previously accused of opening its borders from this side to Ethiopian forces during the conflict between the two parties (1998-2000), significantly impacting Eritrean forces in that region as documented by Mahjoub Al-Basha in his book “The Warring Brothers: The Eritrean-Ethiopian War.”

The Bagaa Conference in the state

Press conference for the Bagaa Conference Party in the Red Sea state, Sudan (Social media- Archive)

A Seat at the Negotiation Table

According to a paper titled “The Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the African Century” by University of Leeds political science professor Lionel Cliffe, proxy wars are a traditional pattern in the policy of the mentioned region’s countries, aiming to gain political benefits by embracing armed opposition movements.

In this context, Eritrea’s support for Sudanese armed groups provides the most effective tool for active participation in formulating solutions and final settlements upon reaching the negotiation stage. Through its allies, Eritrea can ensure its future interests in Sudan, particularly in its eastern region.

For Asmara, this mirrors a similar experience hosting factions from the Eastern Sudan Front at the beginning of the millennium. They launched an armed rebellion against the Salvation regime, culminating in the Eastern Peace Agreement with Khartoum in 2006. This agreement led to Eritrea’s ban on the activities of Eritrean opposition factions on its soil, contributing to establishing a safe security environment on its western borders since then.

Former Allies

Despite the relative scarcity of information on the nature and number of active Sudanese forces in Eritrea, many sources indicate their inclusion of the Bagaa Conference, led by Musa Mohammed Ahmed, a leader of the Eastern Front who signed the Eastern Peace Agreement in Asmara in 2006. By virtue of the agreement, Musa became an assistant to Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir until his ousting in 2019.

In addition to this party, forces affiliated with Omar Mohammed Taher Omar, the historical military commander of the Bagaa Conference, stand out. He refused to sign the Eastern Peace Agreement and kept his fighters within Eritrean territories to this day.

While the aforementioned groups mostly align ethnically with the Bagaa tribes speaking Bedawi, other parties have established training camps within Eritrea comprised mainly of the Ingessana-speaking Bagaa tribes, such as the United People’s Liberation and Justice Front led by Secretary Dawood, and the newly emerged East Sudan Liberation Forces under the leadership of Ibrahim Dinya.

Moreover, the mix includes the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Arkou Manawi, primarily stationed in Darfur, western Sudan, unlike the other movements geographically linked to the eastern region.

While many of the mentioned figures are considered former allies of Asmara in Sudan, a new development is the formation of an armed movement from tribes historically opposed to the Eritrean regime organized within these camps. This indicates the level of concern shared by both parties over potential security disturbances in eastern Sudan.

Expressing this sentiment, the leader of the East Sudan Liberation Forces in a recorded message emphasized that the formation of his movement aims to defend the eastern Sudanese population in case the conflict expands towards them, preventing the recurrence of violations against civilians in Wad Medani city after the army’s withdrawal and its subsequent invasion by the Rapid Support Forces.

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