Reports indicate that the brigades of Al-Qassam, the military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas located in northern Gaza, did not seek support from other brigades in the sector despite the Israeli ground operation in the region having been ongoing for 14 weeks.
Conversely, Israel expanded its operation, assigning command in the south to the 98th Division, comprised of the 35th and 55th Paratrooper Brigades, in addition to the “Oz” Brigade, which includes units such as Duvdevan, Maglan, and Egoz.
According to a report prepared by Salam Khader, the Israeli military leadership deployed the 7th and 5th Armored Brigades, Givati, Kfir, and Karayot battalions alongside the 5th Brigade to confront the elite Khan Yunis Brigade of Al-Qassam, one of the most prominent elite brigades in the organization.
Complex Operation
The Khan Yunis operation is considered one of the most complex during the war, encompassing all the factors that conventional armies nearly fear, being a small, densely populated area.
Israel adopts traditional warfare tactics, particularly relying on dropping bunker-busting munitions from the air to reach the depths of the tunnels to target the leadership and control of the resistance.
The US Army War College had previously issued a report cautioning against a ground incursion before the Israeli operation in the sector, stating that previous similar air operations had not achieved the desired objectives.
Al-Qassam’s Hybrid Organization
Conversely, Al-Qassam relies on a “hybrid organization” in its combat, integrating elite elements that draw from conventional armies, emphasizing discipline and performance, and some military traditions.
These traditions include soldiers remaining in a specific location for weeks without engaging in combat under any circumstances, awaiting the execution of a specific mission, as witnessed in the ambush in the Maghazi camp, which resulted in the killing of over 20 officers and soldiers.
Additionally, there are field units responsible for direct engagement, maneuvering, and rapid execution and withdrawal. These units consist of small groups ranging from one fighter to four.
Al-Qassam has also developed its combat capabilities, engaging both above and below ground after training its fighters to adapt to oxygen deprivation and decreased natural light sources, facing heightened risks in dealing with non-traditional confrontations, including the toxic gas utilized by Israel in one of the tunnels.
Israel deployed forces from two main axes, Kassoufim to strategically isolate Khan Yunis entirely, effectively cutting off the central region and entering agricultural lands, reaching the coastal line at Rashid Street.
Simultaneously, forces from the southeast entered to utilize Salah ad-Din Street to separate eastern Khan Yunis from the west, dispersing the resistance’s efforts.
A week after this attack, the city transitioned from a battlefield into one of the conflict’s means between the two parties.
Israel also faced the challenge of destroying the tunnels, which are a nightmare for soldiers due to their slow lethality and significant reduction in reliance on modern technologies, upon which the Israeli Army heavily relies in what is known as the “Doctrine of Maelot” – superiority.
Israel misjudged the enemy’s strength and placed significant focus on technology, which are fatal mistakes in urban warfare, as the task for infantry, according to the Americans, lies in identifying the enemy’s locations and neutralizing them. If the enemy succeeds in nullifying this equation, eliminating them becomes nearly impossible.
