As over 125 days have passed since the start of the war in Gaza, criticisms are mounting within Israel from evacuated settlers towards the government agencies, particularly the leadership of the Home Front. Some senior military leaders criticized the “evacuation of border towns during the war,” prompting former Chief of Staff Avi Kochavi to state that “Israel is shrinking.” This was a clear critique of the effectiveness shown by the Home Front leadership, indicating its failure to implement emergency plans during the war.
Establishment Background
The roots of the Home Front leadership trace back to the Civil Defense, established after Tel Aviv was bombed by Egyptian aircraft during the 1948 Palestine War in response to Israeli massacres. The Knesset passed a law in 1951 defining the tasks of Civil Defense.
For four decades, Israel did not face significant threats internally, and Civil Defense was not genuinely tested. The surprise came during the Second Gulf War when, on the night following the coalition forces’ attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait in January 1991, Scud missiles launched from western Iraq began raining down on Tel Aviv and Haifa, with a total of 39 missiles during the war.
Israel resorted to US Patriot batteries, revealing that Civil Defense operated under World War II-era methods relying on primitive early warning systems, leading many residents of Tel Aviv to evacuate their homes.
Subsequently, a wide debate arose regarding the mass evacuation of residents during the war, as the military rejected the concept of defense in depth, opting for an offensive doctrine transferring battles to enemy territory.
Civil Defense Doctrine
Building on lessons from war, the Home Front leadership was established as a military command under the Israeli Army on February 2, 1992, approximately a year after the end of the Second Gulf War, taking on civil responsibilities during war while other army branches focused on military aspects.
A main command center was designated in Ramla along with 6 subsidiary centers, a military college for training, and around 65,000 soldiers, mostly reservists.
These forces were assigned several tasks, including formulating and implementing a Civil Defense doctrine, training civilians in cooperation with civil institutions on handling emergencies, and coordinating activities with ministries, local authorities, and the private sector in Civil Defense.
The Home Front leadership began its prominent work by preparing all new homes built since 1994 with fortified rooms for protection against conventional and chemical weapons.
Exposure in the Lebanon War
The 2006 Lebanon War exposed fundamental deficiencies in the operational capabilities of the Home Front, with an average of 120 rockets falling daily throughout the over a month-long war, resulting in the deaths of 39 Israeli non-military individuals and injuries to two thousand others.
Thousands of residents voluntarily evacuated from border settlements without a governmental order, residing in temporary tents. During the war, the Home Front focused on search and rescue operations, yet failed to provide protection or supply essential needs to the population, lacking psychological and social support. Weak coordination between the military and civilian institutions also surfaced.
A State Comptroller report highlighted confusion regarding Civil Defense emergency preparedness, intertwined military and civil fronts, and threats faced by settlers pressuring decision-makers. Military developments influenced residents’ morale and resilience.
2014 War
In 2012, the Israeli government approved a plan to evacuate residents from combat-adjacent areas, adopting the “Host Hotel” plan requiring each local council to create housing capacity for up to 4% of the municipality’s population.
Against the backdrop of the 55-day 2014 war, including missile launches from Gaza, and the death of a Kibbutz Nahal Oz resident from a mortar shell, discussions arose about evacuating Israeli population centers in future conflicts. Doubt emerged about evacuating settlers under fire, seen as surrendering to Palestinian resistance pressure.
The Israeli military acknowledged operational benefits in evacuating border settlements when facing serious threats, initiating emergency evacuation plans in coordination with the Home Front leadership.
An emergency plan named the “Safe Distance” was prepared to evacuate 70% of approximately 54,000 individuals living in 64 residential clusters and settlements along the Lebanese border, and 29 communities in the Gaza periphery within 4 kilometers of the border.
The plan mandated evacuating displaced persons within a maximum of 120 hours from the evacuation order to designated schools and hotels for temporary accommodations, preserving their community structure, while some inhabitants remained in evacuation areas to ensure economic activity continuity.
Significantly, the army and Home Front excluded the possibility of evacuating densely populated communities near the borders like Kiryat Shmona near Lebanon and Sderot near Gaza, with a combined population of 38,000. This decision derived from existing missile defense coverage provided to these areas.
The army and Home Front concluded that any extensive battle with Hezbollah would target missiles across all of Israel, making widespread evacuations challenging due to the absence of safe zones then. Hence, encouraging residents to remain in their homes would likely be the choice under those circumstances.
Latest Surprise
In the morning of October 7, 2023, fighters from the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, breached the border barrier in the “Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa,” seizing the Gaza division headquarters of the occupying army and 22 settlements over 30 kilometers deep into the Gaza Strip. Additionally, the following day, Hezbollah began attacks on military positions along the border with Lebanon.
The Israeli army evacuated around 100,000 individuals from areas adjacent to Gaza, including the city of Sderot, and another 60,000 from the northern border regions, including Kiryat Shmona, in an exceptional measure beyond the pre-prepared plan.
The high number of evacuees imposed significant economic costs on Netanyahu’s government with disruptions to their work and governmental aid requirements. Each evacuee not provided a hotel room by the government received $50 daily. Reports of rape, theft, and complaints about difficulties in securing essential needs emerged, affecting morale, and placing a burden on Netanyahu’s administration.
As the war prolonged, Defense Minister Yoav Galant in January 2024 allowed the return of residents living 4 to 7 kilometers from the Gaza border, providing each adult returning home with 200 shekels daily and minors with 100 shekels. This government offer will remain in effect until the end of February 2024, with the possibility of extension.
Moreover, on January 8, 2024, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu allowed Sderot residents to return home by February 4, resulting in Al-Qassam Brigades launching 14 rockets at Sderot on the same day.
These circumstances led some evacuees to protest outside Netanyahu’s office, sleeping in front of it, refusing to return until they felt provided security. Complaints increased about challenges in accessing essential living needs, reflecting a decline in morale, posing a burden on Netanyahu’s government and representing a new failure for the Home Front leadership.
