With the passing of Henry Kissinger on November 29, 2023, at the age of 100, his legacy has once again come to the forefront. The announcement of his death has served as a reminder of his controversial diplomatic legacy, as he "occupied people's minds and filled the world" and has remained a polarizing figure among political elites in the West and around the globe since his emergence on the political scene in the late 1960s.
Kissinger began his governmental career as the National Security Advisor before becoming the Secretary of State during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford from 1973 to 1977. His tenure as the head of foreign affairs witnessed significant political and economic transformations, leaving an indelible impact on the course of American diplomacy.
The Godfather of Policies
Kissinger was no ordinary official simply executing the policies of the administrations he worked with. He was the godfather of many policies and strategies that shaped American foreign policy during the Cold War. His supporters described him as the "giant of American diplomacy" and the most influential figure in U.S. foreign policy.
His policies enabled his country to extricate itself from the quagmire of the Vietnam War through negotiation and opened communication channels with China, inaugurating diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing. The same was done for the relationship with the Soviet Union, where, according to his proponents, his policies successfully contained the growing communist influence in various parts of the world, reducing tensions with the Soviet bloc.
In contrast to this admiration and veneration, Kissinger's record and political legacy face severe criticism from his adversaries in America and elsewhere in the world. Kissinger, the consummate pragmatist, did not hesitate to strike deals with authoritarian regimes and undermine democracies.
For them, his legacy represents the ugliest embodiment of the U.S. approach to achieving interests by any means necessary and imposing influence worldwide. Critics refer to him as a tyrant for committing numerous atrocities and crimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, Chile, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and many other regions.
While we are not here to evaluate the arguments that have dealt with Kissinger's legacy, it is worth drawing readers' attention to an article by the writer James Mann, recently published on "Politico," titled: "The Six Myths Kissinger Created About Himself and How Everyone Fell for Them." Through this piece, Mann endeavors to look at Kissinger's legacy beyond the binary of adulation or vilification.
James Mann, a prominent American journalist with more than two decades in journalism, is also an important historian with multiple books on America's relations with the Middle East and China, notably his "Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet."
What is noteworthy in his article is that many of the obituaries written after Kissinger's death, whether laudatory or resentful, rely on narratives Kissinger himself documented or disseminated in the media. According to Mann, these narratives contain "a wide range of stories and deceptive lies built by Kissinger about himself throughout his professional life."
Dispelling the Myths
This particularly applies to Kissinger's achievements regarding China, where "much of the adulation he received – even when acknowledging his destructive policies in places such as Vietnam and Cambodia – tends to regard him as the statesman, the visionary, and the architect of the idea of opening up to China."
The writer notes that he's been aware for years of the problems with Kissinger's narratives since, while writing some of his books, he had the opportunity to examine secret documents declassified by courts under the Freedom of Information Act, and to review personal memorandums written by those who worked with Kissinger.
Mann admits that these sources reveal many stories that sometimes fundamentally differ from the flattering accounts Kissinger has chronicled in his memoirs or passed on through friendly opinion columnists.
With this background, Mann engaged in a mission he calls "putting things in their proper context" by debunking the six myths Kissinger created to promote himself and craft a halo around his achievements.
Firstly, the idea of opening up to China was not Kissinger's initiative
Kissinger's name is linked in people's minds as the initiator of the idea of opening up to China. However, the truth, according to the writer, is that President Richard Nixon was the real initiator and main driver behind this idea. To debunk this popular notion, journalist James Mann turned to the memoirs of Alexander Haig, Kissinger's deputy at the time.
In the memoirs, Alexander shares the story of Kissinger coming out of a meeting with President Nixon, saying: "Our leader has lost his grip on reality. He believes this is the right moment to establish relations with communist China. He just ordered me to undertake this fantastical, far-fetched journey." According to Haig's account of that moment, "Kissinger put his head in his hands and exclaimed in amazement: 'China!'". Based on this narrative, Kissinger initially scoffed at the idea of establishing relations with China, which contradicts the commonly revered role attributed to him in the U.S.-China relations file, neither as an initiator nor as an enthusiast for the idea.
Secondly, Kissinger lied about the most fundamental and significant aspects of his secret trip to China
Mann points out that the accounts offered by Kissinger in his memoirs remained the main reference for all information related to his secret trip to Beijing in 1971 for decades. The writer accuses Kissinger of lying in his memoirs when he stated that Taiwan was "only mentioned briefly during his first meeting with Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai."
Relying on related documents, mainly the record of Kissinger's meeting with Zhou Enlai declassified in 2002, it appears that the subject of Taiwan took up the first third of the meeting, contrary to Kissinger's claim that Taiwan was "barely mentioned" in it.
Unwarranted Concessions
Even more concerning, according to the new details provided by those documents, is that Kissinger during that meeting made "significant concessions that have since continued to control and hinder the course of U.S. policy towards China and Taiwan."
A case in point, the official U.S. stance before Kissinger's trip to China was that the sovereignty issue over Taiwan was "an unsettled matter." However, during that visit, Kissinger promised Zhou Enlai that the United States would not support two Chinese governments (one in Beijing and one in Taipei) nor agree on a "one China, one Taiwan" solution, nor would it endorse Taiwan's independence.
The writer then questions the justification for Kissinger's concessions as expressed in those promises, which still influence America's stance on Taiwanese independence: were these concessions necessary for the continuity of the opening initiative with China?
Mann believes this is still unclear, even though some think it was not worth such concessions. He adds, "We must remember that America's opening to China also meant China's opening to America, especially since at that time, China was living in extreme poverty and in a climate of escalated military strife with the Soviet Union."
The writer concludes that China was very eager to establish a new relationship with the United States. Based on this conclusion, he derives that looking retrospectively at the U.S.-China relationship, there doesn't appear to be any confirmation that Kissinger needed to make such significant concessions so early in the negotiations.
Thirdly, Kissinger deliberately concealed some of the missions where his diplomacy failed with China
The writer confirms that Kissinger, since leaving the formal diplomacy and political scene within the United States decades ago, has been consistently mentioned in diplomatic literature as the architect of the idea of opening up to China, which paved the way for President Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. This celebration, according to the writer, ignores the missions where Kissinger's diplomacy failed in China.
Embarrassing Actions
The writer bolsters his argument with an event that occurred in 1995, when the "Los Angeles Times" – where he worked at the time – won a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, granting access to a classified study conducted by U.S. intelligence agencies on the early U.S. negotiations with China.
One of the study's revelations was that Nixon and Kissinger wanted China's help in finding a settlement for the Vietnam War. The study also detailed that, in 1972, they sought Beijing's assistance to bring the North Vietnamese negotiation representative, Le Duc Tho, to China for talks on Chinese soil during Nixon's historic trip to China. However, China declined the offer.
As for embarrassing behavioral conduct, the writer refers to a statement attributed to Kissinger during Nixon's 1972 visit, stating, "After a Peking duck dinner, I’ll agree to anything."
This statement could simply be a remark showing Kissinger's enjoyment of his trip to China, but the writer interprets it as the beginning of "Kissinger's fascination with China." To confirm this infatuation, he quotes one of the secret memorandums Kissinger sent to Nixon in 1973, in which Kissinger states, "China may now be the closest to us in its global perception. None of the other world leaders has the capacity and imagination possessed by both Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou."
Fourthly, Kissinger imposed himself as an intermediary for presidents and world leaders
The obituaries mentioned that after leaving government work, Kissinger acted as a go-between for the United States and other countries, especially China. This notion seemingly implies that American officials were asking Kissinger to act as an intermediary.
Brutal Realism
However, a review of Kissinger's actual record reveals that it wasn't the case. On the contrary, "Kissinger was accustomed to imposing himself as an intermediary, unbidden, and even when he was unwelcome."
The writer notes that tracing Kissinger's movements after leaving public service showed that "he would travel to China on his own, mostly for business purposes. When he had the chance to meet Chinese leaders, he took it upon himself to tell them what American officials were thinking and declaring in Washington. Then, upon his return to the United States, he would go to the White House or the State Department and volunteer to inform American officials about what was happening in Beijing."
Furthermore, the writer argues that Kissinger not only played the intermediary behind the scenes but also attempted repeatedly to return to power after his dismissal in 1976 (after Jimmy Carter was elected president).
In 1980, he orchestrated a "Republican National Convention deal," which stipulated that former President Gerald Ford would be Ronald Reagan's vice-presidential candidate and Kissinger would be the Secretary of State. Reagan's election team politely rejected the proposal. Kissinger tried again in 1988 when he suggested to George H.W. Bush's team that he "take charge of U.S. diplomacy with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev as the administration's primary envoy."
From this, Mann concludes that Kissinger often imposed himself as an intermediary more than what American presidents wanted.
Fifthly, in Chinese affairs, Kissinger was not as realistic as he claimed
Kissinger is often depicted as a man who adopts a realistic approach in international relations. Therefore, the author recognizes that he might actually be a realist, especially since he "devoted his projects, in many parts of the world—as his critics have accurately noted in his obituaries—to a strict, and sometimes brutal, realist approach."
However, closer scrutiny of his body of work with China reveals that he was more romantic than realistic. The writer recollects a detail from one of Kissinger's private memos to Nixon regarding China, written after a 1973 visit to Beijing where he met Chairman Mao Zedong. Kissinger wrote of Mao: "his personality exudes an aura of power and profound wisdom… I was impressed by the man's greatness this time more than on the previous occasion. One can easily imagine the strength and intelligence of this man in his youth". Such an assessment, the writer argues, would not come from a realist.
Sixthly, Kissinger's statements contributed to exaggerating his role in diplomacy with China
Prior to Kissinger's death, reports indicated that he played a role in de-escalating tensions between the Biden administration and China, adding that the high-level contacts between the two countries occurred as a result of a visit Kissinger made to Beijing. Again, the facts say otherwise. If Kissinger traveled to China in mid-July, the Biden administration had already sent Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to Beijing, and talks were already underway to arrange a visit for Chinese leader Xi Jinping to the United States in November. Therefore, Kissinger played no role in this diplomatic matter.
