As the Israeli military campaign against the Gaza Strip enters its third month, the primary factor that has so far prevented its spread into a broader Middle East conflict is that the key parties involved—apart from Hamas, namely Israel, Iran, and the United States—share a common goal of avoiding its escalation into a regional war. The Lebanese-Israeli front remains reasonably under control, despite increased exchanges of attacks between Hezbollah and Israel in recent days.
Additionally, assaults by Iran-backed groups in Syria and Iraq against U.S. targets and American responses have not spiraled out of control. Even with ongoing Houthi assaults to obstruct shipping lanes to Israeli ports and growing Western warnings to the group, there is no indication that unrest in the Red Sea region could lead to regional warfare.
However, the consensus among the warring parties to avoid larger regional escalation has gradually started to fray following Israel's assassination of Hamas's deputy political bureau chief, Saleh al-Arouri, and other Palestinian leaders in the southern suburbs of Beirut.
The increasing concern over the Hezbollah conundrum is prompting Israel to escalate military operations against the group, while simultaneously seeking U.S. support for a major strike to push back the perceived threat from its borders and reassure Israelis for their return to the northern regions.
Hezbollah's response to the assassination remains unclear, and whether that reaction will amplify the risks of a wider war between the group and Israel. Yet recent statements by Hezbollah's Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in response to the killing of al-Arouri indicate Tehran and its regional allies' continued determination to avoid a regional war.
While this resolve helps, in part, to reduce the risks of a broader regional confrontation, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's strategic maneuvers and miscalculations in the shadow and proxy war between Israel and Iran are heightening the dangers of the conflict broadening in the Middle East.
Israel's inability to achieve the three stated objectives of the war on Gaza—eliminating Hamas, retrieving Israeli prisoners held by Palestinian resistance, and establishing a new status in Gaza that poses no future security threat to Israel—has become apparent over the past three months.
Despite this failure, Israel has shifted to new levels of warfare, but this change in strategy is unlikely to reverse the course of the war in Israel's favor. Therefore, Netanyahu believes that assassinating Hamas leaders abroad helps conceal his embarrassment over the Gaza war and claim Israeli victory.
Meanwhile, Israel's dilemma concerning Hezbollah has grown significantly due to major shifts imposed by the group on the rules of engagement on the Lebanese-Israeli front since the war erupted on October 7th. Hezbollah's military expansion near the northern Israeli border has created a severe issue for Israel, leading to the displacement of thousands from the northern regions who refuse to return for fear of a broad war with Hezbollah.
While the Biden administration has not endorsed Israel's plans—reportedly pressing Tel Aviv through 'The Wall Street Journal' to avoid heightening tensions with Hezbollah—Netanyahu believes escalation of the proxy conflict with Iran will compel U.S. support for a large-scale strike against Hezbollah. Netanyahu might correctly assume that Washington will not abandon Israel if conflict with Hezbollah becomes inevitable.
Ultimately, the key factors that will determine whether this conflict will turn regional are Tehran and its regional allies' ability to maintain discipline in the proxy war and the U.S. stance against stirring the war.
For Tehran and its allies, the importance of the risks of entering a broader regional confrontation with Israel and the U.S. is weighed against the belief that Israel's failure in the Gaza war does not justify the risk of deeper regional involvement, especially given the Palestinian resistance in Gaza's continued resilience against Israeli war plans.
For the U.S., it's likely to adhere to its strategy aimed at preventing the war from spreading further across the Middle East, as such expansion would ultimately involve U.S. engagement in the conflict. Nevertheless, Netanyahu's game aiming to entangle Hezbollah in a war, pulling the U.S. into the conflict, and misjudgments in the shadow and proxy war between Israel and Iran could all lead to disastrous outcomes.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, initiating a tour of the Middle East, seeks to mitigate the risks of escalating warfare, but the window of opportunity for the U.S. and Iran to confront these growing regional dangers is narrowing.
