Turkey has been expecting Russian President Vladimir Putin to make his long-awaited visit on February 12, but Turkish officials recently informed the Russian news agency “TASS” that the visit has been postponed to a later date.
Given that previous dates set by Ankara for the visit have faced a similar fate to the February 12 appointment, frequent postponements have become customary in the scene surrounding the visit. This raises discussions about the issue of the date as much as the visit itself.
In April last year, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan anticipated Putin’s visit to Turkey to attend the opening ceremony of the “Akkuyu” nuclear power plant at the end of the same month, but the latter participated in the event via video link.
At the beginning of February, Russian media reported that Turkish banks had started closing accounts of Russian companies after the United States imposed additional sanctions on foreign banks allegedly involved in Russian military-industrial supply transactions.
In August last year, Erdogan once again expected the visit to take place in the same month, but it also did not happen. Since the beginning of the close relationship between Turkey and Russia in recent years, there hasn’t been such ambiguity in determining the presidents’ visit dates for such a long period.
Initially, there are two enigmatic issues regarding the visit date: firstly, Turkey has always been the one to initiate setting dates without Russian confirmation. Secondly, Russia has not explicitly confirmed Putin’s intention to visit every time, constantly discussing the issues to be addressed without specifying a date. These two issues are difficult to interpret clearly in the relations between the two countries that have witnessed a strong momentum in recent years.
The lack of the visit in April last year could be attributed to Putin’s waiting for the results of the Turkish presidential elections held in May. However, the failure to conduct the visit in the second scheduled date after the elections in August, and also in the recent date of February 12, raises questions about whether there are disagreements between the two countries hindering the agreement on a visit date.
Adding to the legitimacy of these questions is the fact that in the last canceled appointment, Putin himself alluded to it during his year-end press conference by mentioning that he would visit Turkey at the beginning of the new year. His statement at that time was understood to imply that the visit would take place in the first month of the new year, or at the latest, in the second month.
Although Ankara and Moscow have not explicitly shown any potential disputes preventing the agreement on a visit date, recounting some prominent developments in Turkish-Russian relations since Erdogan first set the visit date may help explain the surrounding ambiguity.
About a month before the second canceled appointment in August last year, Turkey allowing five Azov Sea Ukrainian Navy members to return to their country with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who visited Turkey in July, sparked Moscow’s protest. Russia accused Ankara of not abiding by the agreement that allowed Azov Sea commanders to leave Ukrainian territory for Turkey and stay there until the end of the war.
With the beginning of February, Russian media reported that Turkish banks had started closing accounts of Russian companies after the United States imposed additional sanctions on foreign banks alleged to be involved in Russian military-industrial supply transactions. While Turkey has not explicitly confirmed these reports, a Kremlin spokesperson said that Moscow is discussing this issue with Ankara.
In January, Turkey signed a memorandum with Romania and Bulgaria to cooperate in the field of maritime mine clearance in the Black Sea region. Although Moscow did not publicly comment on it, it falls within Turkey’s efforts to enhance cooperation with countries bordering the Black Sea, viewing Russian policies in the Black Sea as a threat to the geostrategic balance in the area. Also, in January, Turkey approved Sweden’s membership in the NATO North Atlantic Alliance.
The continuation of Turkish-Russian relations post the Russian-Ukrainian war and growing trade between the two countries since then does not hide the fact that this stability faces additional challenges. These challenges include Ankara’s close relationship with Ukraine and its support for Kiev’s NATO accession, Turkey’s increasing cooperation with other Black Sea countries, and its efforts to improve relations with the West.
It is still unclear whether the potential new appointment date at the end of April or the beginning of May will put an end to the ambiguity surrounding the visit. What can be inferred from Turkey’s persistent rush in setting repeated visit dates and Russia’s continuous confirmation that the visit will take place is that both countries aim for the anticipated visit to mark a new turning point in Turkish-Russian relations.
