The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a rebellious faction in Sudan, have experienced no difficulty in penetrating deep into Al Jazirah State. Their unopposed occupation of the regional capital, Wad Madani, which is only 170 kilometers southeast of Khartoum and home to the First Infantry Division, represents a dangerous shift in the level of the ongoing war. Al Jazirah, known for hosting thousands of internally displaced persons and as an active hub for relief operations, has now become the Achilles' heel—the deadly vulnerability in the army's ranks.
The National Front Fractures
Wad Madani and its surrounding areas have recently been plunged into a state of panic, displacement, murder, and rape, amid the shocking withdrawal of the Sudanese army. This has led to a severe fracture in the trust between the army leadership and its civilian support base.
Although the Sudanese Armed Forces issued a public statement regarding their withdrawal from the First Infantry Division, mentioning for the first time ongoing investigations into the circumstances surrounding the retreat, the terse statement contained a phrase difficult for people to interpret. It likely referred to unjustified withdrawals in other areas, as witnessed at the Yarmouk Factory and the Jabal Awliya' camp south of Khartoum, as well as most garrisons in Darfur, in a manner reminiscent of handover operations, or more accurately, secret deals between regional commanders and the RSF.
Many of these cities and strategic locations did not witness actual combative engagements. Notably, Wad Madani, which is naturally fortified, is difficult to occupy with its limited entrances, surrounded by the Blue Nile's Hantoub Bridge to the east and flanked by army outposts stretching to Al Kamlin locality, adjacent to Khartoum.
Even until Sunday afternoon, Wad Madani was celebrating victory, with residents who decided to stay convinced the city would never fall. What unfolded, and could this loss mark the beginning of a comprehensive military rectification?
A Struggle Without a Battle
Intelligence reports, journalistic information, and field realities were painting a reassuring picture of the situation in Wad Madani. However, the sudden collapse happened dramatically, with no ground encounters. City residents were taken aback to find the insurgents shutting down streets, establishing checkpoints, and violating sanctities amid scenes of looting and terror. The battle they had been prepared for never occurred.
What is puzzling about the battle for Wad Madani is that the retreating army commander left behind a considerable stockpile of weapons, ammunition, and military equipment, sparing the insurgents the trouble of buying or smuggling arms across borders. The equipment was neither relocated nor destroyed, as is typically the case during a withdrawal. It was clear from the outset that the RSF was fully confident in its ability to take control of the city.
The RSF pushed forward with its top leaders, deploying hundreds of fighters and mercenaries from within Khartoum, some in open vehicles – easy targets for air strikes – and others on motorcycles, as if on a leisurely ride. They would not have taken such a step if they were not sure the pathway was clear for the plunder of Al Jazirah and attainment of significant spoils and morale-boosting victories with minimal losses.
The Old Breach
The RSF is known for relying on monetary incentives and gifts to buy off officers, local administrators, and the morally weak. In a similar vein, the First Infantry "Al-Baqqir Brigade" fell on the first day of the war due to betrayal by one of the military institution's officers.
Subsequently, the rebellion spread to the Kamlin locality, swallowed up the Baqqir area and the Giad Industrial City, then moved on to Al Masoudiya, Al Maseed, Al Nouba, and Kab El Jedad. Throughout this, no one intervened, and Al Jazirah's government deceived people by insisting the state's borders were secure, while it lost control of its most significant localities. The lack of immediate action to remove the division commander indicated that the conspiracy against the army predates the war, with persistent efforts to infiltrate its ranks.
This was one of the reasons for the downfall of the former National Salvation Regime, tempting international intelligence agencies to invest in the conflict, sponsor the insurgents, and provide them with funds and intelligence.
Danger Looms for All
After the seizure of Wad Madani by the invaders, responsibility was pinned on the division commander, Major General Ahmed Al Tayeb, with rumors circulating about his dismissal and accusation of treason. However, the similar collapse of many areas and military garrisons points to a broader issue beyond individuals, hinting at a general conspiracy, collective negligence, and potentially, preparations for military coups. The danger still hovers over Sudan, and everyone awaits the next surprise to see what actions will follow.
Control over Al Jazirah state could signify a potential turning point in the central Sudanese battles. Unless the army moves swiftly to mount a comprehensive military operation to retake the state and advance from there to Khartoum, the rift will widen, the country will collapse entirely, and militias will spread terror, damage infrastructure, open training camps, establish new supply lines, and even threaten important cities like Port Sudan, the seat of government, airport, and main seaport. The refugees fleeing war will no longer feel any sense of security in any part of Sudan.
The Gap and the Solutions
The RSF offered ludicrous justifications for the attack on Wad Madani, including preventing the mobilization of recruits that Al-Burhan allegedly relied upon and ensuring civilians' security. Meanwhile, the Secretary-General of the Islamic Movement released an audio recording explicitly calling on the army leaders to reveal the truth to the Sudanese people and arm the recruits to avoid fractures within the domestic front.
Essentially, this also drove the latest assault, which came with negative propaganda and psychological warfare by those behind the RSF, aiming to show the army as weak, creating a rift in the public's trust. This would then set the stage for their significant offensive.
Certainly, Wad Madani is not the end. The army leaders need to rapidly review their operational strategies, shifting from defending military positions to going on the offensive, deploying on the ground, preserving critical strongholds, and maintaining the public's support. Operations targeting RSF leaders, alongside seeking strong allies abroad, are crucial. A country cannot fight alone against an enemy with external protection and support.
Above all, there is an urgent need for a national government up to the challenge of managing the state's affairs, allowing the army to focus entirely on quelling the rebellion and cutting off the external conspiracy.
