Two clear conclusions can be drawn after the American and British attacks on the Houthi group in Yemen. First, the spread of the Israeli war on Gaza across the Middle East is growing, creating a turbulent regional situation that will be difficult to resolve once the war ends. Second, the United States, which sent military reinforcements to the region after October 7 for purposes that include preventing the war from expanding, is now working on its enlargement and deepening its involvement.
The notion that the use of force will deter the Houthis from continuing their attacks in the Red Sea, or undermine the ability of Iran’s other allies to threaten American interests in the region, is as naive as the Israeli belief that the war on Gaza will lead to the elimination of Hamas.
The United States has once again put itself in a state of enmity with the Houthis after years of the Biden administration’s effort to court the group by removing it from the American terrorism list; to encourage them to enter a peace process to end the Yemeni war.
It is interestingly ironic that the United States, which pressures Israel to envision the day after the war on Gaza ends, does not itself possess a clear concept of dealing with the subsequent day that might slip into a more dangerous and widespread conflict.
It can no longer be assumed that the Houthis will abandon their previous caution in designing attacks in the Red Sea, which were previously used as merely a pressure factor to end the war on Gaza. This implies that a period of disturbance will continue in one of the most vital maritime corridors for both regional and global economies.
The Red Sea front now represents a microcosm of the new Middle East that has entered a state of uncertainty following the Israeli war on Gaza. As Iran-backed groups escalate their attacks on American forces in Syria and Iraq, increasingly countered by American responses, the situation on the Lebanese-Israeli front is no less dangerous, with the specter of a new war looming between Israel and Hezbollah.
The trajectory of tension has, over time, become independent of the course of the war on Gaza, whether in terms of action and reaction or the underlying circumstances leading to its emergence today. The only factor that has so far prevented escalation on the Lebanese-Israeli front from developing into war is that both parties do not desire it for various reasons.
However, this factor becomes less influential in the current dynamics of the Israel-Hezbollah confrontation as other factors prevail, making war an unavoidable option. And even if the day after the end of the war in Gaza seems more complicated, no one possesses a clear vision for what the Middle East will look like in a moment of a major conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, nor how the American response would unfold.
Even if the Biden administration lacks less costly options to deal with the regional repercussions of the Gaza war other than military force as a deterrent, deterrence alone will not be sufficient to minimize regional risks.
Interestingly, the United States, which pressures Israel to envision the day after the war on Gaza ends, does not itself possess a clear concept of dealing with the subsequent day that might slip into a more dangerous and widespread conflict, other than hoping to avoid this scenario.
The fundamental weakness in American strategy in dealing with this regional turmoil lies in Washington’s belief that the deterrence factor can dissuade Iran and its allies from deepening their engagement in the war, and that pushing to reduce the Israeli war on Gaza and urge regional countries to engage in the American vision for managing Gaza post-war will automatically reduce the regional risks stemming from the war.
Part of this belief may be true, especially since Iran and its allies still show greater restraint in their military activity. However, the incentives for continuing this discipline are decreasing. Iran also sees the regional repercussions of the Gaza war as an opportunity to show its regional power and increase military pressure on the American military presence in Syria and Iraq through its proxies, maximizing the Houthis’ influence in the security equation in the Red Sea.
As the United States treats the Gaza war as an opportunity to renew its military presence in the Middle East, Tehran also sees it as an opportunity to raise the military costs on the American presence in the region. Even with the role of the war on Gaza taken into account in fueling the current regional unrest, it is now fueled more by this war than being merely a consequence of it.
The collapse of prospects for reviving the Iranian nuclear deal under Biden, Benjamin Netanyahu’s return to power, growing doubts about the future of the American role in the Middle East, the new geopolitical competition between the great powers and its reflections on the Middle East, and finally the war on Gaza, have all created new horizons for Iran to reshape the regional political geography.
The October 7 war led to significant shifts in the Middle East, whether in terms of reviving the Palestinian cause and its role in shaping the dynamics of regional and international politics in the Middle East or in terms of re-heating the proxy war between the United States and Iran, in addition to stirring fault lines in the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.
Regardless of the outcomes of the Gaza war and the scenarios of the current regional turmoil, predicting a new Middle East that is more stable has become mere illusion. The truth that Biden and his aides must take into account when deciding to launch military strikes in the region is that force alone will not clean up the mess left by the Israeli war on Gaza.
